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10 | Executive Summary
Anti-vehicle mines (AVMs) have always had a humanitarian impact, but their 
significance has often been overshadowed by the higher-profile topic of 
anti-personnel mines (APMs), and thus the need to address AVMs has been 
neglected. In some countries, AVMs now present a greater threat to civilian 
populations than APMs, yet they are often viewed as a marginal issue in 
international fora.
This publication seeks to depict the physical, social, economic and develop-
mental impact of AVMs. AVMs are landmines designed to be triggered by 
vehicles rather than individual people. They can remain active for decades, and 
a number of them are difficult to detect with normal demining equipment and 
techniques. A reduction of the duration of the active life of AVMs, restrictions 
on the laying of AVMs outside perimeter marked areas, increased detectability 
and accurate recordkeeping should be promoted as immediate steps to limit 
the humanitarian and developmental impact of these weapons.
When aid and development vehicles, agricultural machinery, private cars and 
trucks and even large animals detonate AVMs, the consequences deploy far 
beyond the immediate death, injury and destruction. Fear of further accidents 
can have a devastating effect on supply networks in a number of ways. Past 
cases have shown that when AVMs are present, it can become prohibitively 
expensive to move resources to isolated communities; displaced people 
cannot return to their homes; refugee camps must be maintained for longer 
than necessary, draining funds away from reconstruction and rehabilitation 
projects; and local trade in goods and agricultural products is reduced or 
brought to a standstill. Thus, the indirect humanitarian impact of a single AVM 
accident can be many times greater than that of an APM. 
While the impact of APMs can decrease over time as clearance efforts 
progress, this study found that in some instances the opposite trend is true 
for AVMs. Increased mechanisation of agriculture, increased use of transport 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
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vehicles and the development of new infrastructure are all positive signs of a 
recovering economy, but they also mean greater vulnerability to the threats 
presented by abandoned and forgotten, but nonetheless active, AVMs. 
In Cambodia, a doubling of 
AVM casualties in recent years 
has overshadowed the decline 
in casualties from APMs. There 
have been numerous incidents 
where tractors loaded with ten 
or more people hitting AVMs 
in areas considered safe. As 
increased prosperity has led 
to growing mechanisation 
of farming, vehicles are now 
detonating AVMs in places that 
had, for years, been safe for 
foot traffic or non-mechanised 
agricultural practices.
In addition, as Afghanistan and South Sudan work to stabilize their societies 
and expand their economies, numerous infrastructural, agricultural and 
housing development projects in line with these goals have been hindered 
by the presence of AVMs.
Figures provided by affected states and news media reports make it clear that 
AVMs represent a significant and continuing humanitarian problem. However, 
poor reporting of incidents results in inconsistent statistics, hampering a 
better understanding of the scale of the problem and its on-going impact. 
To address this, it is essential that government and mine action personnel 
take steps to make reporting more reliable and able to distinguish between 
AVM and APM incidents.
AVMs are not subject to the same rules applied to APMs in International 
humanitarian law (IHL) In the absence of a more stringent legal framework 
regulating AVM use, much remains to be done in terms of the implementation of 
current provisions to ensure compliance with humanitarian principles and norms.
| ICRC vehicle damaged by an AVM in Angola. 
| The accident resulted in five casualties.
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This publication is based on a research project to assess the humanitarian and 
developmental impact of anti-vehicle mines. As the international community 
continues to explore the possible need and options for further legal regulation of 
AVMs,1 there remains a demand for more rigorous analysis of the specific impact 
of AVMs on civilians and developing societies that are either in the midst of, or 
recovering from, conflict. This publication seeks to bridge this knowledge gap, 
highlight trends and shortcomings and offer recommendations. 
The study found that the presence of AVMs, laid on roads, on roadsides and in 
fields not only continues to result in civilian deaths and injuries, but also has a 
number of permeating negative effects on communities and states as a whole. 
These effects include inhibiting humanitarian aid, delaying post-conflict recovery, 
and hampering development efforts in both the near and long-term. Furthermore, 
AVM presence causes fear and thus has an enduring ability to prevent populations 
from using land productively, using transport effectively and building infrastructure. 
The study proposes a number of recommendations, including:
1. Discussions on further regulating the use of AVMs to comply  
with existing IHL principles should continue.
2. Geographic coordinates of mines and minefields should be  
systematically recorded.
3. If AVM use cannot be deterred or prevented, States should explore  
ways of increasing detectability.
4. Civilian populations should be educated on the specific hazards  
posed by AVMs.
5. States should be encouraged to disaggregate their landmine data  
to better distinguish APMs and AVMs.
6. Reporting forms should be further standardized.
The study was carried out jointly by the Geneva International Centre for 
Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) and the Stockholm International Peace Research 
Institute (SIPRI). Its methodology involved gathering existing literature, legal 
documents and information (documentation, data and interviews) from mine 
action centres (MACs) and operators on the ground, conducting national AVM 
basic impact surveys (BIS) and fieldwork, and from soliciting expert advice. 
The study features case studies from Afghanistan, Cambodia and South Sudan.
1 Also commonly known as anti-tank mines (ATM) and mines other than anti-personnel mines 
(MOTAPM)
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This publication provides a background to AVMs, with a section exploring 
technical aspects followed by an explanation of applicable legal frameworks. 
A global overview covers data availability, current usage, casualty data and 
impacts on development. The three case studies provide concrete examples of 
these findings. The conclusions identify trends and make recommendations based 
on the research.
Increased prosperity in northwestern Cambodia has led to a growing mecha-
nisation of farming activities, including a higher number of tractors. These are 
detonating anti-vehicle mines in places that had, for years, been safe for foot 
traffic or non-mechanised agricultural practices. Eight Cambodian farmers 
were killed and one was critically injured on 3 February 2012, after their truck 
hit two anti-tank mines in Banteay Meanchey province. Seven of the farmers 
died instantly as the truck ran over the AVM; the eighth victim died later in 
hospital from the injuries sustained in the blast.
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CHARACTERISTICS
An AVM is a type of landmine designed to damage or destroy vehicles, including 
tanks and armoured fighting vehicles. Compared to APMs, AVMs typically have a 
much larger explosive charge and a fuse designed to be triggered only by pressure 
akin to that of vehicles. Some AVMs are also manufactured with additional fusing 
systems, giving users the option of fitting anti-disturbance and anti-handling 
devices, triggered by countermeasures or when someone tampers with the mine 
or tries to remove it from the ground. AVMs are designed to damage or destroy 
hardware and to injure or kill vehicle crews and passengers.
Simplicity
While the technical design of AVMs has changed over time, the underlying 
concept remains the same: most are simple, adaptable and can be mass-produced 
at relatively low cost. A fusing mechanism responds to pressure or the proximity 
of a target and is connected to a large explosive charge. Simplicity brings low-cost 
reliability and therefore makes the weapon attractive and available to almost all 
armed forces, regardless of their budgets. Although more sophisticated electronic 
fuses are becoming available, their high cost has prevented widespread use. 
Whatever the type of AVM, they are still cheap relative to the weapon systems 
that they are designed to defeat.
Versatility
AVMs very effectively render ground unusable. They can be used to deny access to 
one area, to channel enemy forces into another desired area and to slow down an 
enemy’s advance, giving time for defenders to marshal their forces and exposing 
enemy armour to more effective anti-armour fires. AVMs can be laid by hand, 
mechanically, remotely by aircraft and artillery or scattered by other systems from 
less than 500 metres. Different fuse systems respond to pressure, break wires, 
electric commands and a range of electrical and magnetic sensors. Many types 
of AVMs offer the option to fit different types of fuse providing more flexibility for 
military and non-state actors (NSA). Almost all AVMs can be booby-trapped using 
manufactured features or improvised devices to add further unpredictability to 
their use. Different types of AVMs may be buried, laid on the surface or placed at 
the roadside to increase their range and impact.
Lack	of	discrimination
AVMs are generally designed to discriminate between smaller targets (persons 
and sometimes smaller vehicles) and larger ones (larger vehicles and tanks). 
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They do so primarily by requiring more force to be applied to trigger them than 
would normally be associated with a person on foot. Most magnetic fuses 
respond only to the larger metallic-magnetic signature associated with a vehicle 
or tank. None of these systems can reliably discriminate between a military and 
a civilian target. 
Longevity
Few AVMs have self-destruction, self-neutralisation mechanisms or self-
deactivating feature designed to make them safe after a set period of time. Most 
AVMs continue to be dangerous to populations after conflicts have finished and 
for as long as the fusing mechanism and explosive fill remain functional. While 
climate, temperature and solar radiation all degrade the function of AVMs, some 
types, made from tough plastics and high quality internal components are likely 
to remain dangerous for very long periods of time – certainly years and in many 
cases several decades. Under the right conditions even metal cased mines from 
the Second World War have been found to be in excellent condition well into the 
21st century.
| An AVM on a road in Angola. 
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Features
Most AVMs are pressure-operated with a relatively simple mechanical fusing 
system initiating a main charge housed in a thin outer casing. Many use TNT 
or TNT/RDX as the main charge, though others occasionally use more powerful 
explosives or mixtures. Plastic casings are widely used for ease of manufacture 
and resilience, though wooden and metal casings are still found in older designs. 
Shock-resistant fuses are used to defeat explosive mine countermeasures and 
allow scattering. Booby-trapped AVMs incorporate integral anti-handling features 
to discourage hand lifting. Some AVMs contain very little metal, making them 
extremely difficult to detect with the metal detectors used during most mine 
clearance.
Although there have been many variations, the design of anti-vehicle blast mines 
has been largely dictated by the requirement for mechanical laying or scattering 
and efficient function. Cylindrical mines are most common, generally with 
a central pressure plate or fuse. This configuration was widely favoured by the 
major producers of landmines.
Employment
AVMs are normally buried flush to or just below the surface, to a depth of 50 mm; 
at greater depths the fuse may be too well protected by the soil to operate. In 
some countries, such as Cambodia and Afghanistan, AVMs were buried deep to 
prevent detection and a wooden pole was used to transfer the pressure from the 
ground level to the mine’s pressure plate. Minefields are often laid with a mix of 
AVMs and APMs. In order to avoid sympathetic detonation, large AVMs are usually 
placed several metres apart. Typically, the mines would be laid in straight lines or 
zigzag ‘clusters’, where AVMs are surrounded by APMs. It is not uncommon for 
two or more mines to be stacked in the same hole to produce a more powerful 
blast that will penetrate armour. AVMs are also used by insurgent groups to deny 
routes, ambush security forces or terrorise communities; some have been and can 
be improvised or ‘locally manufactured’.2 
Typical	operation	
The AVM is armed by the insertion of the fuse assembly or the completion of the 
explosive train; some AVMs also incorporate an arming delay. Once armed, the 
AVM is set off when sufficient force is applied. With pressure fuses, activation 
normally results in the immediate detonation of the main charge.
2 IHS Janes, Mines & EOD Operational Guide – AT Blast Mines, March 2014
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Effect
Blast AVMs rely primarily on the shockwave produced by detonation of the high 
explosive. Small AVMs tend to achieve ‘mobility kills’ on armoured vehicles by 
damaging their running gear. Larger AVMs may destroy the vehicle and crew 
completely, particularly if they have detonated beneath the hull.
AVM	Clearance
Minimum metal AVMs present the greatest challenge to clearance operations: 
slow manual excavation methods will be necessary if animal detection 
systems (ADS) or mechanical clearance systems are unavailable or unsuitable. 
The possibility of encountering anti-disturbance and anti-handling devices 
means that AVMs are usually destroyed on site or, if it is necessary to move 
them, are pulled remotely using a long line to keep clearance operators safe from 
any explosion. Clearance rates are affected by other factors such as soil type, 
vegetative cover and local climatic conditions.
Mechanical demining assets can significantly increase the rate of technical 
survey and clearance, but most are not designed to withstand repeated AVM 
detonations. Even if there is no critical damage to a machine, necessary repairs 
can be expensive and time-consuming, particularly when operating in remote 
locations. This creates ‘down-time’ that greatly increases the costs of such 
operations.
Following the use of mechanical demining equipment on roads, repair work may 
be required if the intervention has destroyed the road surface. Systems have 
been developed that, owing to their size, mass and protection, are capable of 
withstanding multiple AVM detonations without major damage. In practice, 
however, some of these systems are hard to use in the operating environments 
encountered in humanitarian demining because of their purchase price, 
high running costs, requirements for maintenance and the inadequate local 
infrastructure for transporting large machines. Locally manufactured machines 
are also used for clearance and some Mine Protected Vehicles (MPVs), armoured 
and designed to sustain an AVM blast, have been fitted with metal detection 
systems and ground penetrating radar.
Animal detection systems (ADS) are based on the ability of certain animals to 
detect the vapour emanating from landmines and other explosives. They can be 
speedy and cost effective when searching for AVMs under the right conditions, 
but they cannot normally be used in areas with dense vegetation and are easily 
affected by adverse weather conditions. 
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Several systems exist for rapidly dispensing mines to cover wide areas, as opposed 
to soldiers laying each one individually. Some AVMs are designed to be dropped 
from aircraft or fired by artillery, and they arm themselves once they land in the 
target area.
Off-route mines, also known as horizontal action mines, are designed to fire an 
explosively formed projectile into the side of the target vehicle. They are used as 
ambush mines or where the ground or road surface is not suitable for burying or 
concealing a mine. They typically employ a shaped charge to focus the explosive 
effect in order to pierce armour and the resulting over pressure within the vehicle 
has a devastating impact on the crew.
DEVELOPMENTS OF AVMs IN THE 20th CENTURY
Even before the deployment of the first tanks in 1916, similar devices had been 
developed for use against locomotives (e.g. by Confederate forces during the 
American Civil War).
The First World War saw the first use of AVMs by the Germans as a counter-
measure against the first tanks introduced by the British. Initially, they were nothing 
more than a high explosive shell or mortar bomb buried upright with a special fuse. 
Later, purpose built mines consisting of a wooden box packed with explosives and 
triggered either remotely or by a pressure fuse were developed. By the end of the 
war, the Germans had developed mine-laying techniques including the laying of 
mine rows. AVMs accounted for up to 15 per cent of U.S. tank casualties during 
the final stages of the war.
The Soviet Union began developing AVMs in the early 1920s, and in 1924 
produced its first AVM. The mine had a 1kg charge: enough to break the tracks 
of contemporary tanks. At the same time, in Germany, the first modern AVM, the 
‘Tellermine’, entered service in 1929. It was a disc-shaped device, approximately 
30cm wide, containing approximately 5kg of high explosives.
During the Spanish Civil War (1936–39), both sides used AVMs. Republican 
forces lifted mines placed by Nationalist forces and then used them against 
the Nationalists. This encouraged the development of anti-handling devices for 
AVMs. The Winter War between the Soviet Union and Finland (1939–40) also 
saw widespread use of AVMs, as did the Second World War. More sophisticated 
features, such as shaped charges, satchel charges and sticky bombs, were also 
developed. 
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The second battle of El Alamein (23 October to 4 November 1942) and the 
battle of Kursk (4 July to 23 August 1943) are two of the best examples of the 
use of landmines, particularly antitank mines, during the Second World War. 
In both cases, the defending forces relied on landmines to create a defensive 
barrier and to help determine the path the attacking forces would take. 
The principal difference lay in the ability of the defensive forces to hold their 
positions once the attacker had cleared the minefields. At the second battle 
of El Alamein, German forces under Field Marshal Erwin Rommel needed to 
hold off a much larger British force. In an effort to stop the British advance, 
Rommel ordered his engineers to put out 451,372 landmines. While the initial 
plan called for 30 per cent of the mines to be anti-personnel mines, available 
supplies limited the number of anti-personnel mines to only six per cent of 
the mines used. Surprisingly, 180,000 of the mines were British AVMs from a 
series of abandoned British minefields. While the Germans recovered some 
of the English mines for new minefields, two of the British minefields were 
incorporated directly into the Axis defences. In all, the Axis spent over three 
months preparing the minefields at El Alamein. Most, if not all, of the minefields 
were covered by artillery fire.3 
AVMs used during the battles across North Africa and Europe more than 
70 years ago still represent a threat. Egypt is continuously dealing with this 
legacy, but occasionally a reminder from the past makes headlines in the heart 
of Europe. For instance, in December 2011, a detonation tore a crater 10 meters 
wide next to a road between the towns of Gross Ossnig and Neuhausen, 
some 100 kilometres southeast of Berlin. The area had been a storage site for 
a nearby bridge construction project. Bomb disposal experts found two more 
mines nearby. They were too unstable to remove and had to be blown up in 
the same spot. Some 400 residents living within one kilometre of the area 
were evacuated and told to leave their doors and windows open to prevent 
the glass shattering from the shockwaves. The area was the scene of fighting 
in the Second World War because it was close to an airfield where newly-
built Focke-Wulf combat aircraft tested their machine guns. The airfield was 
bombed several times. Elderly locals recalled that weapons and munitions were 
thrown in a bomb crater near the airfield. That might explain why the mines 
were found buried three or four meters deep – they were evidently discarded. 
If they had been planted to take out a tank, they would have been placed much 
closer to the surface.
3 A dissertation in history – the development of landmine warfare by Norman Edgar Youngblood 
IV, B.A, M.A (December 2002)
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Modern AVMs are usually more advanced than simple containers full of explosives 
detonated by vehicle’s pressure. The main advances since the Second World War 
have been:
• More powerful effective warheads (different explosive compounds and 
shaped charge effects).
• Use of non-ferrous materials making them harder to detect.
• New methods of deployment (from aircraft or using artillery).
• More sophisticated fuses (triggered by magnetic and seismic effects,  
or combinations of effects).
• Sophisticated ‘anti-disturbance’ devices to neutralise countermeasures  
and prevent or discourage tampering or removal.
| Truck damaged by AVM explosion in Angola.
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LEGAL FRAMEWORK
The use of AVMs is regulated by a set of IHL principles and rules, the vast majority 
of which are set out in treaties and represent legal obligations for States who 
are parties to those treaties. This chapter draws on a paper produced by the 
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) entitled ‘Rules of international 
humanitarian law applicable to anti-vehicle mines and presented at the Meeting of 
Experts on Mines Other than Anti-Personnel Landmines within the framework of 
the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW),4 in April 2012. 
Rules	of	customary	international	law
The rules of customary international law stem from the general practice accepted 
as law and are independent of other provisions established in international treaties. 
They may be applicable in international or non-international armed conflicts, or 
both, and are binding on both states and non-state actors.
The most significant principles of customary IHL applicable to AVMs are distinction 
and proportionality.
The ICRC study on customary international law details these rules as follows:5
• The principle of distinction requires parties to the conflict to distinguish 
between civilians and combatants and to direct attacks against 
combatants only.
• The principle of proportionality in attack prohibits attacks which may be 
expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage 
to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would be excessive  
in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated.
Additionally, the ICRC study recognises three specific customary rules which 
directly address landmines and which are applicable to both APMs and AVMs:
1. Care must be taken to minimise the indiscriminate effects of landmines.
2. Parties to the conflict are required, as far as possible, to record the 
placement of landmines.
4 ICRC, Rules of international humanitarian law applicable to anti-vehicle mines.  
CCW/MSP/2012/WP.1 (2012)
5 ICRC ‘Customary IHL Database’, Rule 1,  
http://www.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v1_cha_chapter1_rule1 (accessed: 21 March 2014)
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3. At the end of active hostilities, parties to the conflict that have used 
landmines must remove or otherwise render them harmless to civilians,  
or facilitate their removal.
Finally, the ICRC also recognises that ‘parties to the conflict must allow and 
facilitate rapid and unimpeded passage of humanitarian relief for civilians in need, 
which is impartial in character and conducted without any adverse distinction, 
subject to their right of control’.6 
Specific	treaty	rules
Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions
For States that are party to it, Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions, 
applicable to international arms conflicts, sets out important limits on the use of 
AVMs, namely:
• Article 35 limits the right of parties to the conflict to choose any methods 
and means of warfare and prohibits the use of weapons and methods 
of warfare that can cause superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering. 
• Article 51.5 prohibits indiscriminate attacks. 
• Article 57.1 requires parties to take constant care to spare the civilian 
population and civilian objects.
• Article 57.2 requires parties to take all feasible precautionary measures  
in the choice of means and methods of attack in order to avoid, and  
in any event minimise, incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians  
and damage to civilian objects. 
Subject to certain conditions, Article 70 requires parties to the conflict to allow 
and facilitate rapid and unimpeded passage of all relief consignments, equipment 
and personnel.
As for non-international armed conflicts, Article 3 common to the Geneva 
Conventions prohibits acts of violence against the life and person of people 
taking no active part to hostilities. Additionally, within the framework of Additional 
Protocol II to the Geneva Conventions applicable to non-international armed 
6 ICRC ‘Customary IHL Database’, Rule 55,  
http://www.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v1_rul_rule55 (accessed: 21 July 2014)
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conflicts, Article 13 stipulates that the civilian population and individual civilians 
must not be the object of attack. In addition, Article 18.2 allows for humanitarian 
and impartial relief actions for the civilian population.
Amended Protocol II, Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons
AVMs themselves are not subject to a specific international convention, but are 
subject to specific rules found in Amended Protocol II (APII) to the CCW. APII 
specifically regulates the use of mines, booby-traps and other devices including 
‘mines other than anti-personnel landmines’.7 Article 6(3) specifically deals with 
‘remotely delivered mines other than AP mines (MOTAPM)’. The article states that: 
‘It is prohibited to use remotely-delivered mines other than APMs, unless,  
to the extent feasible, they are equipped with an effective self-destruction or self-
neutralization mechanism and have a back-up self-deactivation feature, which  
is designed so that the mine will no longer function as a mine when the mine 
no longer serves the military purpose for which it was placed in position.’
Other rules provided by APII, and applicable to AVM, prohibit the use of mines 
designed to explode as a consequence of the presence of a commonly available 
metal detector8 and the use of self-deactivating mines equipped with anti-handling 
devices capable of functioning after deactivation.9 The transfer of mines is, 
in certain conditions, prohibited.10 In addition, APII requires state parties to record 
all information concerning minefields11 and, without delay after the cessation of 
active hostilities, to clear all mined areas.12 
APII rules applicable to AVMs are weaker than those applicable to APMs. 
For instance, the rule on the prohibition of use of non-detectable mines applies 
only to APM.13 Similarly, the requirement to place mines within a perimeter-marked 
area applies only to manually positioned APMs without self-destruction and self-
neutralisation mechanisms.14 
7 Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby-Traps and Other Devices, 
as amended on 3 May 1996. APII entered into force in 1998 and has 100 state parties,  
http://www.unog.ch/80256EE600585943 /(httpPages)/3CE7CFC0AA4A7548C12571C00039C
B0C?OpenDocument (accessed: 27 March 2014)
8 Art. 3.5 APII to the CCW
9 Art. 3.6 APII to the CCW
10 Art. 8.1 APII to the CCW
11 Art. 9 APII to the CCW
12 Art. 10 APII to the CCW
13 Art. 4 APII of the CCW
14 Art. 5 APII of the CCW
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Recent	developments	in	the	legal	framework	applicable	to	AVMs	
in	the	context	of	CCW	discussions
A number of states, international organisations and non-governmental 
organisations (NGOs) have continued to emphasise the widespread humanitarian 
problems caused by AVMs. New requirements related to the use of AVMs, 
especially in the areas of detectability, limitations on active lifetime15 and perimeter 
marking, have been discussed within the framework of the CCW on different 
occasions. However, the discussions did not lead to a substantive change in the 
legal framework regulating AVMs. 
At the Preparatory Committee for the Second Review Conference (2000–2001), 
a number of states proposed a new Protocol restricting the use of AVMs. However, 
an agreement was not reached in this context. Instead of adopting a new Protocol, 
an open-ended Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) was created, with a specific 
Working Group mandated to address the issue of AVMs. At these discussions 
a draft protocol on mines other than anti-personnel mines commanded a large 
measure of agreement but was opposed by a small number of States Parties. 
Subsequently, at the Third Review Conference of the State Parties in 2006, 
several State Parties16 committed themselves to implementing the provisions in 
the draft protocol on a national basis via a ‘Declaration on Anti-Vehicle Mines’.17 
The commitments included: not using AVMs outside perimeter-marked areas 
if the mines are not detectable or not equipped with a self-destruction or self-
neutralisation mechanism and also incorporates a back-up self-deactivating 
feature; not transferring AVMs in their possession unless certain conditions are 
satisfied, such as, meeting the detectability and active life standards set out in 
the declaration; and limiting AVM transfer to purposes of their destruction or 
development of and training in mine detection, mine clearance or mine destruction 
techniques.18 
15 For example ICRC, Anti-vehicle mines: effects on humanitarian assistance and civilian 
populations, presented at the Group of Governmental Experts of the States Parties to the 
Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons 
which may be deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to have Indiscriminate Effects,  
CCW/GGE/II/WP.9 (2002)
16 Albania, Australia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Denmark,  
El Salvador, Luxembourg, Estonia, France, Israel, Latvia, Lithuania, Netherlands, New Zealand, 
Norway, Republic of Korea, Romania, Serbia, Slovenia, The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, 
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and United States of America
17 Declaration on Anti-vehicle mines, CCW/CONF.III/WP.16/Amend.2
18 Ibidem 
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At the Fourth Review Conference, in December 2011, the AVM issue again featured 
in discussions. At the conference opening, the Secretary-General of the United 
Nations affirmed that progress in the area of AVMs would represent a significant 
improvement in IHL.19 The State Parties decided to convene an open-ended 
Meeting of Experts, in 2012, to further discuss the implementation of IHL with 
regard to MOTAPM and to submit a report to the 2012 Meeting of the High 
Contracting Parties to the Convention.20 At this Meeting of Experts on MOTAPM, 
a study by the ICRC21 assessing the current status of IHL covering MOTAPM 
highlighted the many challenges resulting from the lack of agreement between the 
State Parties during previous discussions on this topic. In addition to the threats 
of AVMs discussed above, other areas of concern included the lack of information 
on implementation of article 6.3 of APII of the CCW and on the implementation of 
states’ commitments and national policies, especially of those having committed 
to the declaration in 2006. 
19 Summary Record of the First Meeting, Fourth review conference CCW, 2011,  
CCW/CONF.IV/SR.1
20 Final Document of the 4th Review Conference, 15 Dec. 2011 CCW/CONF.IC/4/Add.1
21 ICRC, Rules of international humanitarian law applicable to anti-vehicle mines,  
Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons Meeting of Experts on Mines other than  
Anti-personnel Mines (2012) 
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Although the meeting was conducted in a constructive atmosphere, a small 
number of states continued to insist as they had done in the 2002–2006 process 
that existing IHL regulation of AVMs was sufficient, if respected. Most states 
continued to stress that the humanitarian impact of AVMs called for stronger 
regulation. 
At the 2011 Meeting of States Parties, the discussion remained divided and a 
proposal to continue work in the format of an expert meeting in 2013 was blocked 
by a small number of states. AVM under the title MOTAPM has remained on the 
agenda of CCW Meetings of States Parties. It was discussed at the 2013 MSP and 
is listed on the draft agenda for the 2014 MSP.
GLOBAL OVERVIEW
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The full extent of AVM contamination around the world remains uncertain. 
Nevertheless, there is strong evidence that AVMs continue to affect civilian 
populations on a wide scale. In some states, the threat of AVMs is so extensive 
that its negative effects visibly permeate civil society, affecting infrastructure 
development and economic progress at many levels. For other states, the full 
extent and internal impact of AVM contamination is less clear due to unwillingness 
or inability to publically report on the threat. In some cases, news media provide a 
basic insight into the situation by reporting on the continued occurrence of AVM 
incidents and resulting civilian casualties.
This global overview section sets out the nature and specificity of available data 
on the presence of AVMs internationally. It is based on what can be discerned 
from open sources, as well as from the AVM basic impact survey (BIS) conducted 
in the context of this study. The section also discusses how AVMs are used 
internationally (both past and present), by looking at states that import AVMs or 
produce them for domestic use, and states with existing AVM stocks. Expanding 
on the comprehensive picture of the humanitarian and development impact of 
AVMs, this section also examines data on civilian AVM casualties and reporting 
procedures, as well as key development areas affected by AVMs. 
CURRENT USE OF ANTI-VEHICLE MINES
AVMs were used extensively around the world throughout the 20th century and, 
in some countries, new mines are still actively being laid. Some of the world’s 
many AVM fields function as actively monitored military defences. However, for 
the large majority of affected states, AVMs are unrecorded, unmonitored hazards 
from past conflicts. They are lost to the parties that once laid them and pose a 
continued threat to civilian populations. 
AVMs are still widely produced and stockpiled by many countries. Around 
30 countries are still believed to be producing AVMs,22 though a number may 
have ceased active production (see Appendix for detailed AVM type listings by 
country). In addition, there are occasional international collaborations for the joint 
production of AVMs.
While there is some overlap in terms of where AVMs are produced and where 
they are used, for many states, AVMs are produced elsewhere and imported. 
For example, although the African continent is heavily contaminated by AVMs, other 
than Egypt and South Africa, no other African countries have manufactured them.
22 Janes Mines and Mine Clearance, 2011–2012
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Pressure-fused mines target military vehicles and civilian objects and can be set 
off by any object that exceeds the design’s pressure threshold. Some modern 
electronic fuses use a variety of sensors, such as seismic, magnetic influence and 
electronic including combined sensors, which enhance discrimination, allowing 
more selective targeting of military vehicles.23 However, in terms of the AVMs that 
are currently affecting post-conflict and developing states, most are older designs 
with more conventional fusing frameworks.
This study found that the patterns associated with the intended military use 
of AVMs were actually quite rare in the case study countries of Afghanistan, 
Cambodia and South Sudan. This was due to the weapons being used by 
untrained or guerrilla forces. In these countries, combatants in general did not 
receive sufficient training in landmine warfare. Therefore, the laying of AVMs 
was done irregularly and often targeted areas and roads deemed important for 
enemy vehicles transporting supplies and troops. As a result, when making 
contamination assessments, mine action programmes in these countries are very 
careful not to rely too heavily on concepts involving traditional military strategies 
for laying AVMs.
An additional challenge is that many of these AVM users kept no records of where 
the mines are laid as required by the CCW. In many cases, this is because they 
have neither the necessary training nor the resources to create and maintain maps 
or record emplacement coordinates. In other cases, sometimes belligerents did 
not believe keeping records of AVM locations was important, and sometimes they 
have seen keeping maps of the mines as a strategic vulnerability that could not be 
afforded in case the opposing force acquired them.
23 IHS Janes, Mines & EOD Operational Guide – AT Blast Mines, March 2014
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FIGURE	1
 
AVMs IN NAGORNO KARABAKH: PERSPECTIVE FROM A MINE  
 ACTION OPERATOR 24
The Nagorno Karabakh (NK) region between Armenia and Azerbaijan is home 
to approximately 150,000 inhabitants. During the war (1988–1994), mines 
were laid in NK by both countries near strategic positions, but remain until 
this day a danger to the civilian population. All of registered AVM victims in 
NK are males. However, the effects of this are felt more widely. Families often 
lose their only source of income when the male head of the family is involved 
in an accident. Secondary losses include the loss of farming and cultivating 
equipment, medical costs and years of financial debt.
Registred	anti-vehicle	mine	accidents	and	casualties	in	NK	and	green	
zone,	1995–2014
Areas	of	anti-vehicle	mine	accident,	1995–2014
Approximately 51% of AVM accidents occur 
in fields during cultivation or other farming 
activities. Around 36% of accidents take 
place on or near roads. Although fewer 
accidents occur in other locations, they 
nonetheless cause significant damage. 
For instance, vineyards and forests are 
sources of income for local populations. 
Accidents taking place in such locations can 
deter populations from using the areas and 
their surroundings.
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24 All of the information in this section is based on reports registered by The HALO Trust and refers 
to the post-war years from 1995 until the present. The information does not include every single 
AVM accident in Nagorno Karabakh, but does give a concrete representation of the situation.
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Activity	of	the	victim	when	the	accident	occurred,	1995–2014
Information from registered cases 
indicates that the vast majority 
of victims were carrying out 
economic, work-related activities 
when the accident occurred.
Results	of	anti-vehicle	mine	accidents,	1995–2014	
(percentage of HALO registered cases)
Around 38% of accidents are 
fatal. Another 38% result in leg 
injuries, often leading to am pu-
tations. Head injuries account 
for 20% of accidents while hand 
injuries account for 7% of acci-
dents. It is necessary to note that 
the victims typically suffer from 
a combination of the above-
mentioned injuries. 
 
AVAILABILITY AND NATURE OF DATA ON ANTI-VEHICLE  
MINE PRESENCE 
State reports, historical records, databases, news media and other open sources 
form the basis of our understanding of the extent of AVM contamination 
worldwide. Although much information on AVM use and production is not 
released in the public domain, by using a variety of open sources, this study 
provides a basic understanding of the large number of states that have been, 
or continue to be, involved with AVMs. Reasons for this could be active military 
use or training, prior use on their territories, active or past production of AVMs, 
or because of continued reports of AVM related casualties (see Figure 2).
farming             
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other
Source: HALO Trust
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FIGURE	2
 
STATE INVOLVEMENT WITH AVMs AS REPORTED IN OPEN SOURCES
States are listed by the following sources for the specified reasons. See each 
source for more details.
1. Landmine Monitor report on ‘The Humanitarian Impact of Anti-vehicle Mines’, 
2012, listing states with anti-vehicle mine casualties, new use of AVMs from 
1999–2011, or past use of anti-vehicle mines prior to 1999.
2. Jane’s Mines and Mine Clearance, 2008, listing states affected by anti-vehicle 
mines
3. Canadian Forces Mine Database, 2009, listing states with stocks of anti-vehicle 
mines for training, testing, or military use
4. News articles on recently found anti-vehicle mine contamination or recent  
anti-vehicle mine-related casualties, 2010–2014
5. Reported producers of anti-vehicle mines (historic and current) according  
to Jane’s Mines and Mine Clearance, 2011–2012
Afghanistan1234
Albania125
Algeria13
Angola123
Argentina35
Armenia123
Austria5
Australia3
Azerbaijan123
Bosnia and Herzegovina1234
Belarus1
Belgium5
Brazil35
Bulgaria35
Burundi13
Cambodia1234
Argentina35
Central African Republic1
Chad12
Chile1245
China235
Colombia14
Croatia123
Cuba1235
Cyprus123
Czech Republic35
Denmark3
Djibouti12
DR Congo123
Ecuador12
Egypt12345
Eritrea123
Ethiopia12
France35
Finland5
Georgia13
Germany1345
Greece1
Guatemala1
Gunea-Bissau12
Hungary15
India1345
Iran12345
Iraq123
Israel1235
Italy35
Japan35
Jordan123
Kenya1
Kuwait123
Lao PDR123
Latvia1
Lebanon123
Lithuania1
Macedonia1
Mali14
Mauritania123
Liberia12
Libya1234
Montenegro5
Morocco13
Mozambique123
Myanmar12
Namibia123
Nepal1
Netherlands35
Nicaragua2
Niger1
North Korea235
Norway3
Oman12
Pakistan12345
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Peru25
Philippines14
Poland135
Portugal35
Romania35
Russia1235
Rwanda23
Senegal14
Serbia135
Sierra Leone3
Singapore35
Slovakia35
Somalia1234
South Korea1235
South Africa35
South Sudan14
Spain35
Sri Lanka124
Sudan1234
Sweden35
Switzerland3
Syria134
Tajikistan123
Thailand124
Tunisia124
Turkey1345
Uganda12
United Kingdom35
United States35
Vietnam23
Yemen123
Zambia123
Zimbabwe234
Information is thus available to help identify which countries have AVMs on 
their territories. However, a number of hurdles or uncertainties remain, and 
these have made it thus far impossible to assess the full extent of global AVM 
contamination.
The first hurdle is the absence of public reporting in certain affected states. 
For example, in some countries, civil news media continue to report on the 
occurrence of suspected AVM-related casualties (both military and civilian), but 
the government does not provide information in the public domain on existing 
AVMs, and it is not known whether information on contamination and casualties 
is being collected in a systematic way. A second uncertainty is the inability 
of certain affected states to measure the extent of contamination due to the 
absence of mine laying records. In a few other cases, in addition to the absence 
of historical records, current AVM contamination in on-going conflicts goes 
unrecorded. A third uncertainty is that some states, while facing an evident AVM 
threat, have not yet been able to conduct a countrywide survey to determine 
its full extent. A fourth reason for uncertainty, at both global and national levels, 
is the undifferentiated nature of reporting mechanisms where national data 
does not differentiate between APMs and AVMs, but rather groups landmines 
together.
To gain a deeper understanding of these data availability and collection 
challenges, this study conducted a BIS of affected states. The survey assessed 
data collection practices surrounding AVM contamination and casualties, and 
also asked states to specify the impact on different aspects of development 
using a four-point scale.
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The BIS results revealed a number of trends in the areas of contamination data 
and the nature of national data collection practices. A significant reason for 
uncertainty in contamination data is the fact that states did not adequately 
distinguish between AVMs and APMs across their data aggregation and 
reporting processes. The survey asked states to specify their knowledge of 
the extent of AVM contamination and provide estimates at varying levels of 
specificity. The survey found that among those states that reported continuing 
AVM contamination, only about half were able to provide an estimate of AVM 
presence in each of the requested categories. A common reason for the lack of 
an estimate, or uncertainty in a given estimate, was that nationally aggregated 
data did not differentiate between APMs and AVMs. The case study components 
helped the authors learn that there are a number of possible reasons for this 
lack of data differentiation, including the format of national survey processes, 
national data handling procedures and the format of reporting forms used to 
collect contamination and casualty information.
ANTI-VEHICLE MINE CASUALTY DATA
Although AVMs are designed to destroy armoured military vehicles, they 
continue to pose an indiscriminate threat, killing and injuring civilians driving 
standard motor vehicles, agricultural equipment and construction equipment. 
This section discusses globally available data on civilian casualties resulting from 
AVMs. Further details on the types and patterns in AVM casualties are discussed 
in the contexts of the country case studies.
Beyond the reporting efforts of international networks like ICBL, current knowl-
edge of civilian casualties caused by AVMs comes from two primary sources: 
(i) coverage of incidents by the news media; and (ii) figures provided by states 
(typically only from those with established mine action programmes). The sources 
themselves vary greatly from state to state. The study found that while both 
sources of information help to provide a rough indication of the impact of AVMs 
on civilians, both remain incomplete. 
A significant number of AVM-related civilian casualties continue to be reported 
in the news media. As a part of this study, the research team collected news 
items on AVM casualties and recent contamination discoveries (January 2010 – 
May 2014). Casualty incident news items were included either because the 
reporter specifically identified the accident as AVM-related or because the 
signatures described in the article were strongly indicative of an AVM-related 
accident. A total of 190 incidents and 725 casualties were recorded during 
this time period.
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FIGURE	3
 
NEWS REPORTS OF AVM DISCOVERIES AND CASUALTIES, 2010–2014
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It is important to recognise that, for a number of reasons, news media reports 
probably only provide a small part of the full picture of the impact on casualties. 
Importantly, AVMs are often used in open countryside rather than in densely 
populated or built-up areas. Open countryside is usually occupied by small rural 
communities using the land for agriculture or other related purposes. Given that 
the majority of rural populations in developing countries are not regularly covered 
by the media, it is unlikely that deaths or injuries from mines in these areas would 
make it into national news unless the incident was particularly large or significant 
(e.g. a bus). Even in cases where accidents are reported, journalists are not always 
able to distinguish an AVM incident from other weapons, sometimes terming an 
event as a roadside explosion or even mistakenly as a rocket-propelled grenade 
(RPG) or IED attack. Further confusion can result from the fact that the explosion 
of an AVM can cause most traces of the item to disappear. 
State reporting about AVM-related civilian casualties is an even more important 
data resource, yet it remains insufficient on a number of levels. In the most 
severe cases, states with suspected casualties resulting from AVMs release no 
information at all, and it is unknown whether the government systematically 
collects casualty information. 
In other cases, state reporting on AVM-related civilian casualties is actively 
conducted as a part mine action programmes, but reporting remains incomplete 
due to an inability to cover or access all areas of the country. In some cases, 
reporting is incomplete because of the nature of data collection procedures and too 
much ‘freedom’ for authors describing incidents. This issue is illustrated in more 
depth in the case studies where mine action personnel can enter a number of terms 
into a victim or incident report (e.g. AVM, anti-tank mine, AT, ATM, etc.), making 
it difficult to later sift out aggregated AVM statistics from a national database.
Another important reason why national AVM casualty counts are likely to be 
incomplete is the lack of historical records of such casualties during periods of 
conflict. The BIS asked states to provide total civilian casualty counts from AVMs 
on a year-by-year basis for as far back as their records could go. In nearly all cases, 
casualty counts in earlier years were significantly lower than those from more 
recent years. In particular, for many states, annual casualty counts rose significantly 
upon the establishment of a mine action programme: the increase in casualty 
figures is due to better data collection rather than an actual increase in casualties. 
Figure 4 shows the total numbers of AVM-related civilian casualties from states 
responding to the BIS. For the reasons described here, the majority of states noted 
in their responses that actual casualty figures (versus recorded casualty figures) 
are likely to be significantly higher.
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FIGURE	4
 
INCOMPLETE AVM CASUALTIES REPORTED BY STATES  
 THAT PARTICIPATED IN THE BIS
DEVELOPMENTAL IMPACT OF ANTI-VEHICLE MINES
Study findings show that the negative impact of AVMs has a significant 
potential to increase precisely when a state is progressing in its post-conflict 
recovery and development efforts. This effect is made dramatically worse 
by low metal content AVMs. This section briefly describes these trends, and 
illustrates them in further detail in the Afghanistan, Cambodia and South Sudan 
case studies.
Due to higher pressure thresholds, AVMs are unlikely to be triggered by people 
on foot or non-mechanised farming, as APMs are. When displaced communities 
begin to return to areas mined during conflict, any threats from APMs or 
explosive remnants of war (ERW) quickly become apparent during resettlement 
or subsistence farming; AVMs are more likely to go unnoticed and pose a latent 
threat to future development efforts.
This increasing development impact of AVMs can best be explained using a 
concept of various triggers that occur as a state moves from a situation of conflict 
to one of active economic development. Such triggers include the return of 
internally displaced persons (IDPs) to contaminated land, followed by construction 
efforts involving heavy machinery; the transition from subsistence farming using 
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manual labour to mechanised farming with tractors or heavy ploughs; increases 
in the number of vehicles per capita for both farming and transportation; 
or development close to newly cleared roads. 
FIGURE	5
 
DEVELOPMENT ‘TRIGGERS’ INCREASING THE IMPACT  
  OF LATENT AVMs
Conflict or initial post 
conflict situation
Development triggers leading to increases 
in AVM casualties or contamination 
discoveries
Communities displaced during conflict; 
area mined or contaminated by ERW
Return of population or newly settling IDPs 
followed by construction efforts involving 
heavy machinery
Subsistence farming or livestock herding Mechanised farming
Population uses few vehicles More vehicles used for both farming  
and transportation
Roads cleared to width of only 8m 
during emergency humanitarian 
demining
Development occurs in newly accessible areas
Old roads, mined during conflict,  
followed by overgrowth of these roads 
from lack of use
Development of this land for agriculture  
or infrastructure
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Low metal content AVMs have been shown to significantly increase these effects. 
They are a greater long-term hazard to, and inhibitor of, developmental progress 
than low metal content APMs. This is due to the greater likelihood of these 
mines being overlooked until a state begins to advance in the use of mechanised 
construction or farming.
Through the BIS, states reported a wide variety of ways in which AVMs had 
had an impact on communities and development efforts. The survey provided 
a number of components of development to select from, as well as an option to 
describe further unlisted components. States were then asked to rank the impact 
of AVMs on these as un-significant, moderate, severe or very severe. Figure 6 
shows the components of development which states ranked as suffering the most 
severe impacts from AVMs. There was a strong correlation between the scores 
for restoration of land for agriculture, getting roads back into use and restoring 
land for grazing livestock.
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FIGURE	6
 
THE TOP IMPACT AREAS OF AVMs ON COMPONENTS  
 OF DEVELOPMENT AS IDENTIFIED BY 10 STATES
States were asked to indicate whether AVMs had had a negative impact on a list  
of components of development.
The following scoring system was used to calculate the results: no significant 
impact: 0 points; moderate impact: 1 point; severe impact: 2 points; very severe 
impact: 3 points.
The results below combine states’ responses and demonstrate each aspect’s total score.
Aspect Score
Restoration of land for agriculture 17
Road reconstruction 16
Restoration of land for grazing livestock 15
Road access for construction 15
New roads 14
Road access for returning refugees 14
Road access for humanitarian aid 13
Development of new land for agriculture 13
Bridge reconstruction 13
Power grid reconstruction 12
© GICHD – SIPRI
| Farmer’s truck following an AVM accident in Angola. 
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QUANTIFYING THE IMPACT OF AVMs ON TRANSPORT  
COSTS AND TIME
On average, World Food Progamme (WFP) assists 80 million people per year  
in over 75 different countries, distributing food to victims of war, civil 
conflict and natural disasters. To accomplish this, the WFP has developed 
logistics resources and expertise that are unparalleled in the humanitarian 
sector and are often called on by other humanitarian organisations. 
On any given day, WFP operates an average of 5,000 trucks worldwide; 
land transport is its most common delivery method (95.5 per cent of its 
4 million metric tonnes of food is delivered by road). When roads to remote 
locations are blocked by flooding, landslides or AVMs, airdrops are often 
the only viable alternative, but they can cost up to 100 times more per  
kg/km. When a number of road options are available, new techniques using 
Geographic Information Systems allow delivery costs using different routes 
to be simulated and quantified.
 
FIGURE	7 DELIVERY ROUTES
Source: WFP
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WFP first experimented with this method in Ethiopia in 2007. Having compiled 
an extensive geographic database of roads, warehouses and delivery points, 
it was able to simulate road closures and quantify changes in travel time, just 
as a standard car navigation system can pick one route over another. Results 
based on hypothetical data are displayed below:
Figure 7 shows the optimal allocation of delivery points (small dots) to a 
number of warehouses (large dots) throughout Ethiopia. In this configuration, 
overall travel time to all delivery points is minimised. In the Somali region of 
Ethiopia (southeast) total travel time to delivery points from their respective 
nearest warehouses (Dire Dawa and Gode) amounts to 1,050 hours, or an 
average of 5 hours per delivery.
Figure 8 illustrates hypothetical AVMs (shown as red crosses) laid on routes 
leading out of Gode. Only one road, leading southwest, is left open and 
the effect on the allocation of delivery points to warehouses is significant; 
FIGURE	8 DELIVERY ROUTES WITH HYPOTETHICAL AVMs
Source: WFP
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to remain as efficient as possible, most of Gode’s previous delivery points 
must be reallocated to either Dire Dawa or Robe. This translates into an 
increase in total travel time of 300 hours, or an increase in travel costs of 
approximately 30 per cent.
This example goes some way towards showing the concrete cost effects of 
AVMs on the delivery of relief aid. Further research using this technique is 
warranted in order to carry out a quantitative cost-benefit analysis of AVM 
clearance.
CASE STUDIES
48 | Case studies
AFGHANISTAN
As foreign troops begin to withdraw from Afghanistan after over a decade 
of conflict, and as the government works to stabilise the country, its efforts 
continue to be challenged by insurgent activity and unrest in many regions. 
At the same time, Afghanistan is pursuing economic progress and development 
as its population works to resettle and rebuild. The government is taking on new 
infrastructure projects such as railroads linking the country with its neighbours, 
and there are new foreign investment projects in sectors such as mineral extraction 
that will bring in much needed national income.
Landmines, both AVM and APM, continue to affect these attempts to regain 
stability and move beyond the country’s difficult past. A new survey process 
has revealed that AVMs are present in the majority of the remaining landmine-
contaminated areas. Across Afghanistan, the need for land is increasing. This study 
illustrates how AVMs contribute to prolonging poverty by denying access to land 
and transport, and by perpetuating the state of civil unrest that continues to affect 
Afghans, the surrounding region and the international community.
Afghanistan became a State Party to the Mine Ban Treaty in 2003 and is in the 
process of developing national implementation legislation.25 It signed the CCW 
in April 1981, but has never ratified the Convention, and so is not a party to the 
CCW or its protocols. 
The Mine Action Coordination Centre of Afghanistan (MACCA), the Department of 
Mine Clearance under the Afghan National Disaster Management Authority, and 
HALO Trust provided instrumental support in assembling this case study.
 
At least 18 people were killed and seven others were injured in two landmine 
explosions in Shena Rai area of Afghanistan, in July 2012. The first accident 
occurred when a car on its way from Chaman to Spin Boldak hit an AVM. 
A truck carrying 25 people was sent to rescue the victims, but it too detonated 
an AVM. The fatalities included women and children.26
25 Landmine Monitor, Afghanistan Country Profile, Mine Ban Policy, page updated as of  
2 October 2012, http://www.the-monitor.org/index.php/cp/display/region_profiles/theme/1552
26 Source: http://paktribune.com/news/Landmine-blasts-kill-18-near-Chaman-border-251314.html
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Overview	of	anti-vehicle	mine	presence
Given the vast areas of land that have been contaminated since 1979, landmines 
continue to have an impact on the country at large. Although APMs significantly 
outnumber AVMs, the majority of land affected by mines in Afghanistan includes 
AVMs. Accordingly, in implementing the Mine Ban Treaty in Afghanistan, the 
government reported that the presence of many high priority AVM-contaminated 
areas required a focus on both AVMs and APMs.27
As of 2013, there were 4,876 landmine and ERW hazards covering over 544 square 
kilometres of Afghanistan. These hazards are located in 1,688 communities, 
244 districts and 33 provinces, directly affecting 1,313,341 people. These hazards 
are summarised in Afghanistan’s request for an extension of the deadline for 
completing the destruction of APMs in mined areas, in accordance with Article 5 
of the Mine Ban Treaty.28
FIGURE	9
 
REMAINING CONTAMINATION AS OF THE END OF MARCH 2013 29 
Contamination types Number of hazards Area of hazards (sq km)
AVM field 1,423 301.41
APM field 3,255 211.79
Battlefield /ERW 198 31.74
Total 4,876 544.94
Source: MAPA
The vast majority of AVMs in Afghanistan were laid by the Mujahedeen against the 
forces of the former Soviet Union during its decade-long occupation (1979–88).30 
Owing to the Mudjahedeen’s guerrilla-style resistance, many mines were laid in 
irregular and sporadic ways, and most minefields were not recorded. 
27 Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, Request for an extension of the deadline 
for completing the destruction of APMs in mined areas in accordance with Article 5 under the 
Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of APMs and 
on Their Destruction, 31 August 2012, http://www.macca.org.af/macca/?page_id=171, p. 7
28 Mine Action Coordination Centre of Afghanistan Ottawa Proposal YR 1 and YR 2
29 MAPA Annual Report 1391, http://www.macca.org.af/en/MAPA_Reports.html, p. 33
30 Interview with HALO Trust, March 2014
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AVM contamination in Afghanistan is distributed in regional concentrations 
due to the nature of the Soviet conflict, as is described in greater detail later. 
The central region has the greatest number of AVM fields. However, the amount 
of land affected by AVMs is greatest in the south due to more scattered and 
widespread use of AVMs across large areas. The eastern and northern regions are 
notably less affected by AVMs than other regions due to the nature of the conflict 
during the Soviet occupation.31 
FIGURE	10
 CURRENT AVM AND APM PRESENCE IN AFGHANISTAN 
Source: MACCA
National data collection system
The picture of landmine contamination in Afghanistan is changing, not necessarily 
because more mines are being laid, but rather because the data is improving 
through further assessments. Starting in 1993, Afghanistan conducted 
non-technical surveys of landmine contamination, but for different reasons 
(including both methodological issues and obstacles faced by surveyors), they 
were unable to capture a comprehensive national picture of contamination. 
31 Mine Action Coordination Centre of Afghanistan Ottawa Proposal YR 1 and YR 2, p. 33
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The first baseline data-set was provided by the 2003 Landmine Impact Survey. 
A second attempt was made in the form of the 2009 Polygon survey. 
In 2012, because landmine accidents were still occurring in areas thought to be 
clear on the basis of the earlier surveys, Afghanistan began conducting a new 
survey with a more comprehensive methodology. The Mine and ERW Impact 
Free Community Survey (MEIFCS) goes far beyond the reach of past surveys by 
visiting every community in Afghanistan, rather than only the communities noted 
as affected in the current database. This survey process was due to be to complete 
in early 2014. However, efforts have been significantly slowed as surveyors 
encountered large numbers of communities not listed in national census data. 
MEIFCS reports showed that out of the 32,500 communities listed in the base 
census, only 13,000 had so far been surveyed, yet another 18,000 communities 
had been surveyed which were not in the base census.32 These challenges mean 
that Afghanistan will clearly need more time to complete the survey.
The current survey effort is being conducted using the country’s standard Hazard 
Report form, which allows surveyors to differentiate between AVM, APM and 
ERW threats and whether they are new or known hazards. The Mine Action 
Coordination Centre of Afghanistan (MACCA) manages these reports within the 
Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA). Regional survey 
teams collect data on mines and ERW and send them to the national authority. 
Regional offices and community liaison teams also report to MACCA based on 
routine data collection visits and procedures. 
MACCA reports that AVMs have consistently posed identification challenges 
throughout the various national survey efforts. The presence of APMs is often 
much more visible, as incidents involve both humans and livestock, thus alerting 
communities to the threat. However, MACCA reports that people can often be 
found using the land concealing AVMs as part of their residence or for shallow 
farming without knowledge of their presence.33 Only when construction or use of 
farming vehicles uncover or set off an AVM are civilians alerted to their presence.
Over the past 18 years, the Mine Action Programme of Afghanistan (MAPA) 
has cleared almost two-thirds of all the suspected hazards discovered to date, 
including all known contamination within urban areas. However, many areas of 
the country are still inaccessible due to on-going conflicts and the absence of 
usable roads. New hazards are discovered every year due to: (i) on-going conflicts; 
32 Interview with Mine Action Coordination Centre of Afghanistan, March 2014
33 Interview with Mine Action Coordination Centre of Afghanistan, Directorate of Mine Clearance, 
March 2014
52 | Case studies
(ii) survey teams gaining access to previously insecure areas, and; (iii) the return or 
resettlement of IDPs to new or abandoned communities. As a result, the number 
of remaining suspected hazardous areas (SHA) including AVMs, APMs and ERW 
has continued to grow for over a decade, despite the clearance achievements.34
The MACCA map below depicts evidence of this growing picture of contamination 
with a newly identified AVM and APM mixed minefield discovered in December 
2013. These newly identified hazards in Nimroz province in Southern Afghanistan 
were reported to and surveyed by the Mine/ERW Impact Free Community Survey 
(MEIFCS). This was the first time mine action teams visited this area since its 
contamination. Reportedly, these mines were laid over 3 million square meters in 
1993-1994 by the Iranian army inside the Afghan soil. Mines are mainly AVMs with 
APMs used as fuses, and many of the mines were made visible via soil erosion. 
MACCA reports that these mines have caused a number of civilian casualties.35
34 MAPA 2008-2013 Strategy, http://macca.org.af/en/mapa_plans.html 
35 Email communication with MACCA, Area Manager, Regional Office Kandahar, 13 March 2014
| Accident to a local vehicle in the newly  
| discovered AVM and APM contaminated area 
| of Nimroz province.
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| APMs being used as fuses for AVMs throughout 
| the contaminated area. 
| MACCA map depicting the location of the recently  
| discovered AVM-APM mixed minefield covering  
| roughly 3 million square m.
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History	of	anti-vehicle	mine	use
The proliferation of AVMs in Afghanistan began with the Mujahedeen guerrilla 
resistance to the Soviet Union’s invasion in 1979 and occupation until 1988. 
The Mujahedeen used AVMs against Soviet troops in attempts to disrupt the 
movements of tanks and convoys. While the Soviet Union used APMs liberally, 
they did not often resort to the use of AVMs because the Mujahedeen possessed 
or used few heavy vehicles other than those captured from the Soviets themselves.
The landmines used by the Mujahedeen were acquired from foreign countries 
with an interest in defeating the Soviet Union. The United States in particular 
channelled many weapons, including AVMs, to the Mujahedeen through Pakistan. 
The Pakistanis were charged with ensuring the delivery of mines through supply 
channels along its long and porous border with Afghanistan. AVMs including M19 
mines from the United States, TC6 mines from Italy and P2 mines from Pakistan 
were channelled to the Mujahedeen in this way. The Mujahedeen also received 
support from Iran as YM-II and YM-III AVMs were supplied to forces operating 
from the western province of Herat.
| APMs and AVMs exposed by soil movements 
| in Nimroz province in December 2013.
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The nature of the Soviet Union’s occupation of Afghanistan helps to explain 
the pattern of AVM contamination across the country. The Soviet Union’s main 
command and control centre operated out of Kabul, which is why the Mujahedeen 
concentrated on laying AVMs, both in belts and irregularly, around the city. There 
were three main security belts around the city, the third of which extended 
far south.36 
In addition to mine concentrations in the centre of the country, due to the extensive 
assistance to the Mujahedeen via Pakistan, skirmishes were also common in the 
southern regions of Afghanistan, as the Soviets sought to disrupt supply channels 
and starve Mujahedeen forces. The unique flatness of the terrain in the south made 
it suitable for vehicles and mine laying. In order to create barriers against Soviet 
advances, the Mujahedeen would lay AVMs in wide, dispersed and often irregular 
formations. The southern region of Afghanistan remains the area most widely 
contaminated by AVMs. Current landmine contamination in Loghar province, 
located south of Kabul, leading to Pakistan and an important trade route, consists 
of 85 per cent AVM contamination.37 
Similar interactions and AVM-laying occurred to a lesser extent in the western 
regions, as the Soviets sought to starve the Mujahedeen of Iranian assistance. 
To this day, there remains significant AVM contamination near the Iranian border 
as well as in Herat province. 
When the Soviet Union withdrew from Afghanistan in 1989, many predicted that 
the communist government of Afghanistan, known as the Najibullah regime, would 
fall within a matter of months. However, these predictions failed to account for the 
fact that the regime remained well equipped with military hardware and resources 
provided by the Soviet Union. 
Najibullah’s government continued to survive, largely by holding on to a reduced 
territory, concentrating on urban areas and keeping main communication routes 
open.38 During this period of resistance, mine laying was being carried out by 
both the Najibullah regime and the Mujahedeen, who were also fighting amongst 
themselves by this time.39 
36 Interview with HALO Trust, March 2014
37 Ibidem
38 Clements, Frank. Conflict in Afghanistan: A Historical Encyclopedia. ABC-CLIO,  
Santa Barbara, 2003. P. XXV
39 HALO Trust Afghanistan, http://www.halotrust.org/where-we-work/afghanistan
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All defending forces laid landmines to protect their main supply routes (particularly 
the road north from Kabul to the old Soviet border), their airfields, military posts 
around key towns, and the actual front lines. The geography of the conflict meant 
that different factions frequently mined the same areas at different times.40
FIGURE	11
 
COMMON AVMs FOUND IN AFGHANISTAN,  
 BY MANUFACTURING COUNTRY 
TC/6 Italy Minimum metal
MK7 United Kingdom Metal casing
M19 United States Minimum metal
TM-46 Russia Metal casing
TM-57 Russia Metal casing
TM-62 Russia Metal casing
YM-II Iran Minimum metal
YM-III Iran Minimum metal
P2 MK2 Pakistan Minimum metal
P3 MK1 Pakistan Minimum metal
Source: MACCA
Most recently, AVMs were also laid by the Taliban and the Northern Alliance.41 
The Afghan government reports that after the fall of the pro-Soviet regime, 
extensive and indiscriminate use of APM and AVM continued as the Taliban, 
having developed into a significant politico-religious force, clashed with the 
Northern Alliance.42 In 2008, dozens of landmines were discovered in Arghandab 
District, in the southern province of Kandahar, where fighting occurred between 
Taliban insurgents and the Afghan army backed by international forces. 
40 HALO Trust Afghanistan, http://www.halotrust.org/where-we-work/afghanistan
41 Ibidem
42 Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, Request for an extension of the deadline 
for completing the destruction of anti-personnel mines in mined areas in accordance with 
Article 5 under the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and 
Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction, 31 August 2012,  
http://www.macca.org.af/macca/?page_id=171, p. 4
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The Afghan Ministry of Defence reported that the Taliban had laid landmines – 
AVM and APM – on roads and footpaths in Arghandab District, despite a stated 
commitment not to use APMs.43
A significant proportion of the mines used in the Afghan conflicts were minimum 
metal AVMs, often made of plastic casings with only a small amount of metal 
used for the fusing. This fact, combined with disorganised use of the mines and 
a lack of record-keeping, has contributed to the severity of the challenges faced 
by mine action efforts in Afghanistan.
Casualties	from	anti-vehicle	mines
Afghanistan’s system for collecting data on casualties from landmines and ERW 
relies on a network of a variety of actors, ranging from hospitals and clinics to 
community centres and schools. The actual data collection is conducted by 
MACCA’s regional offices, and the process is supported by the Afghan Red Crescent 
Society.44 In practice, this means that mine action personnel may be dispatched 
directly to an accident, if it is promptly reported, or alternatively, they will visit 
places such as health clinics to collect the data in batches. In all cases, mine action 
personnel are required to fill out a Victim Form specifying the details of the case.
MACCA reports that its database contains records of more than 1,200 civilian 
casualties, between 1979 and 2013, directly attributable to AVMs.45 MACCA 
underlines that these numbers are drastically incomplete due to poor record 
keeping during the Soviet Union’s invasion, the ensuing Afghan civil war, and even 
today as many areas of the country remain inaccessible to mine action personnel 
for security reasons.
43 Afghanistan: Landmines impede civilians’ return to volatile Arghandab », Irin News, 22 June 
2008, http://www.irinnews.org/report/78869/afghanistan-landmines-impede-civilians-
return-to- volatile-arghandab 
44 Interview with Mine Action Coordination Centre of Afghanistan, 9 March 2014
45 SIPRI-GICHD AVM Basic Impact Survey Responses from Mine Action Coordination  
Centre of Afghanistan
FIGURE	12 
AFGHANISTAN’S REPORTED AVM CASUALTY DATA AS OF SEPTEMBER 
 2013, WITH EARLY RECORDS SHOWING INCOMPLETE FIGURES
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In addition to a lack of security and inaccessibility, there are further reasons why 
Afghanistan’s national casualty figures are incomplete. In many cases, victims 
of a landmine or ERW incident may be transported to better health facilities in 
nearby Iran or Pakistan. MACCA reports that this is likely to be a common trend 
given the heavy mine contamination near the Iranian and Pakistani borders. 
When this happens, casualty data does not make it back to Afghan health 
clinics and MACCA’s regional offices do not collect it. Another cultural reason 
for possible missing data is that if victims of a mine accident are killed rather 
than injured – which is often the case with AVM incidents – Afghan families will 
often immediately hold a funeral and enter the familial grieving process without 
contacting authorities to investigate. MACCA suspects that much data goes 
uncollected for this reason.46 
Casualties from AVMs are still occurring across Afghanistan today, especially in 
the most heavily mined central, southern and western regions. While much of 
the area surrounding Kabul has been demined, Loghar province, in the south of 
the central region, remains heavily contaminated by AVMs, and tractor drivers 
are common AVM victims due to the growing agricultural activity in this region. 
In the southern regions, Kuchi nomadic families traversing the desert landscape 
are common victims of AVMs. The families use large mules and camels to travel 
or transport goods, the patriarch often leading an animal while his family rides 
on top. The weight of the animal carrying passengers or goods is often enough 
to trigger AVMs. 
A significant civilian casualty factor that is relatively unique to Afghanistan is the 
use of pressure-plated improvised explosive devices (PP-IEDs). In February and 
July 2012, the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) reported that 
armed groups in Afghanistan were deploying large numbers of these explosive 
devices.47 In 2011, UNAMA reported that the majority of PP-IEDs are designed to 
detonate from approximately 10kg of pressure and frequently contain up to 20kg of 
explosive, more than twice that of a standard AVM. As a result of this design, these 
explosive weapons ‘effectively act as a massive anti-personnel landmine with 
46 Interview with Mine Action Coordination Centre of Afghanistan, 9 March 2014
47 UNAMA, ‘Afghanistan, Annual Report 2011, Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict,’ 
February 2012, p. 3, www.reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/UNAMA POC 
2011 Report_Final_Feb 2012.pdf; and ‘Afghanistan Mid-year Report on Protection of 
Civilians in Armed Conflict: 2012,’ July 2012, www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/AF/
UNAMAMidYearReport2012.pdf; reported by Landmine Monitor, Afghanistan Country Profile, 
Mine Ban Policy, page updated as of 2 October 2012, http://www.the-monitor.org/index.php/
cp/display/region_profiles/theme/1552
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the capability of destroying a tank; civilians who step or drive over these IEDs have 
no defence against them and little chance of survival. Additionally a significant 
number of IEDs are encountered with explosive weight of approximately 2–4kg 
specifically designed to maim or kill individuals on foot.’48 
In 2012, UNAMA documented 913 civilian casualties (393 civilian deaths and 
520 injured) from PP-IEDs. In 2013, use of PP-IEDs resulted in 557 civilian 
casualties (245 civilian deaths and 312 injured), a decline of 39 per cent. While 
the decrease is noted, UNAMA reports that the human cost of PP-IED attacks 
in 2013 remained high. PP-IEDs were detonated in public areas used by civilians 
such as roads, markets, government offices, schools and bus stations. UNAMA 
reaffirmed in its 2013 report that PP-IEDs are indiscriminate and reinforced its call 
to end their use.49 
Developmental	impact	of	anti-vehicle	mines
Across Afghanistan, the need for land is increasing. Decades of conflict and 
unrest have devastated the country, with landmines continuing to deny access 
to valuable land and resources. The agricultural sector is particularly important to 
Afghanistan’s recovery and growth – agriculture is the main source of livelihood 
and subsistence for roughly 75 per cent of the Afghan population, and a crucial 
component to enhance food security and drive economic growth for the entire 
country.50
Across numerous sectors, the Government reported in its 2012 Mine Ban 
Treaty Article 5 Extension Request that the socio-economic impact of landmine 
contamination remains severe:
‘The presence of landmines resulted in reducing crop production, in creasing 
transportation costs, and adding obstacles to repatriation and rehabilitation. 
Furthermore, about 8,300 public buildings such as schools, health 
facilities and factories were unusable due to the presence of mines.  
48 UNAMA, ‘Afghanistan Mid-year Report on Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict: 2012,’ 
July 2012, pp. 13-14, www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/AF/UNAMAMidYearReport 
2012.pdf; reported by Landmine Monitor, Afghanistan Country Profile, Mine Ban Policy, page 
updated as of 2 October 2012, http://www.the-monitor.org/index.php/cp/display/region_
profiles/theme/1552
49 UNAMA, ‘Afghanistan, Annual Report 2011, Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict,’ 
February 2012, p. 3
50 USAID, Afghanistan, Agriculture, http://www.usaid.gov/afghanistan/agriculture
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More than 228 sq km of productive agricultural land had been blocked due to the 
presence of landmines. The productivity lost due to this blockage was estimated 
to be valued at USD 11.5 million per year. Landmines laid on and around roads 
– placed by warring factions to disrupt and prevent rival forces from advancing – 
led to severe restrictions to transportation, making the delivery and movement of 
goods more difficult and costly; there was an estimated loss of more than USD 
26 million due to increased transportation costs and extended travel times.’ 51
Some experts and community leaders have warned that the full extent of the AVM 
threat in Afghanistan has yet to be realised. It has been suggested that the greatest 
intensity of AVM use was on village-level roads. Many of these areas are not yet 
being reached by aid agencies because the general security situation makes it 
too risky. As one observer reported, ‘The main roads have never really been the 
issue, it’s the smaller ones, especially those that didn’t see much in the way of 
Kabul government/Soviet control. On these roads they used AVMs as a nuisance, 
for protection, to deny them to the enemy.’52 
FIGURE	13
 MACCA RATED THE FOLLOWING AREAS AS SUFFERING  
  ‘VERY SEVERE’ EFFECTS DUE TO AVMs IN THE BIS
Road access for humanitarian aid
Road access for health care
Road access for refugee return
Road access for construction
Housing reconstruction
Road reconstruction and new road construction
Bridge reconstruction
New housing construction
Restoration of land for agriculture and development of new agriculture areas
Restoration of land for grazing livestock
Restoration of land for grazing livestock 
51 Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, Request for an extension of the deadline 
for completing the destruction of anti-personnel mines in mined areas in accordance  
with Article 5 under the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production  
and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction, 31 August 2012,  
http://www.macca.org.af/macca/?page_id=171, p. 4
52 Anti-vehicle mines: Understanding the impact and managing the risk. Landmine action,  
p. 17, http://www.landmineaction.org/resources/AVMs%20Understanding%20the%20
impact%20and%20managing%20the%20risk(1).pdf
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Beyond denying access to land for agriculture, AVMs continue to affect Afghan 
develop efforts across a number of other areas. The following examples detail 
ways that AVMs have affected resettlement efforts, national infrastructure 
development, and natural resource development.
Impact Example 1: Missed low-metal anti-vehicle mines in Jebrail
A recent example in Jebrail, a suburb of Herat City in western Afghanistan, 
underlines the severe challenge that minimum metal AVMs pose to civilians 
attempting to resettle and develop land. Between 1979 and 1989, the Mujahedeen 
laid many AVMs in the area, namely Iranian copies of the US M19 and the Italian 
TC6. From 1990 to 2008, when the conflict was over, various humanitarian 
demining agencies carried out clearance in the area, finding and destroying 116 
AVMs. After clearance, Jebrail became increasingly populated with returnees and 
IDPs from Herat City and nearby Iran, and the area was actively developed with 
new housing and infrastructure projects. However, during this time, occupants 
found that many minimum metal AVMs had been missed by clearance operations. 
Between 2010 and 2013, HALO Trust conducted a re-clearance of Jebrail; a task 
covering 2,386,723m2. HALO reported facing numerous challenges during this work, 
all compounded by the minimum metal content and low detectability threshold of 
the AVM types in the area. Additional challenges included: the area’s construction 
| Demining efforts in Jebrail.
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boom and the inability to conduct mechanical clearance over in large areas; the 
unexpectedly large amounts of scrap metal creating false signals; the underground 
infrastructure (incl. water pipes and electricity cables) which precluded the use of 
mechanical excavation (and metal detectors in the case of electricity cables) and 
required careful manual excavation; and electrical currents which interfered with 
detectors, requiring full manual excavation or mechanical clearance.
Upon completion of its operations, HALO had discovered an additional 11 AVMs 
that had been missed by earlier clearance efforts. Part of HALO’s success could 
be attributed to novel detection methods, such as ground penetrating radar and 
custom built machinery for mechanical clearance – advances that HALO and other 
deminers across Afghanistan have been forced to develop in the face of the threat 
of minimum metal mines. Dealing with minimum metal AVMs in Afghanistan has 
been described as a process of constant learning and evolution. As a result of 
clearance efforts in Jebrail, a reported 22,215 families will benefit from immediate 
use of the area, and an additional 69,655 as indirect beneficiaries in the local area.
Impact Example 2: Northern Afghanistan railway project
AVMs have posed major challenges for large-scale infrastructure development in 
Afghanistan. Since 2010, Afghanistan has engaged in cooperative international 
projects to develop rail systems connecting Afghanistan with the rest of the region. 
Afghanistan’s central location gives it the potential to become an important hub for 
the transportation of goods to Central Asia, Pakistan, Southeast Asia and Europe. 
Railway projects are seen as a way to provide a more reliable and cost-effective 
option than road transport, helping Afghanistan unlock its mineral and agricultural 
wealth and lift more of its regions out of poverty.
The Hairatan-Uzbekistan rail project was the first substantial common-carrier 
railroad project in Afghanistan. Construction started in January 2010 and the 75 km 
rail link in now operational, connecting Hairatan on the Uzbekistan-Afghan border 
to the city of Mazar-i-Sharif in northern Afghanistan. The project began under the 
auspices of the Afghan Ministry of Public Works and was planned, developed by 
and contracted to Uzbekistan Railways (UTY). The project’s estimated cost was 
USD 170 million, of which USD 165 million was provided by the Asian Development 
Bank (ADB). The remaining USD 5 million was provided by the Afghan Government. 
The Hairatan-Uzbekistan project is part of the transport strategy and action plan of 
the Central Asia Regional Economic Cooperation Programme and aims to boost 
freight volumes and the profile of Afghanistan as a transit hub.53
53 Hairatan-Uzbekistan Rail Project, Afghanistan. http://www.railway-technology.com/projects/
hairatanuzbekistanra/
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Late into the execution of the project, AVM, APM and ERW were discovered. 
The initial assessment revealed a 3 sq km area of contamination at an estimated 
cost of USD 3 million to clear, which came close to matching Afghanistan’s 
national contribution to the project.54
This pattern has been repeated in other infrastructure development projects, 
particularly with AVMs due their low detectability in Afghanistan. MACCA 
contacted development projects throughout the country in 2013 and found that 
a number were in hazardous areas. Out of 430 registered development projects 
in Afghanistan (roads, bridges, dams, rail, agriculture, electricity expansion), 71 of 
these projects are affected by mines and ERW, and at least 21 are heavily affected 
by AT mines, consisting of roughly 225 square kilometres of land.55
As a result, MACCA actively encourages a sustainable and continuous process 
in communication with the development sector; otherwise, as in the case of the 
railway project, the country suffers huge financial losses that it cannot afford.56 
While Afghans hope that the new MEIFCS survey process will help mitigate the 
number of collisions between development efforts and landmines, due to the 
nature of AVMs, their widespread use in the country and the low-metal content 
of the types used in Afghanistan, uncertainty over the possible presence of AVM 
will remain.
Impact Example 3: Copper mine near Anyak 
AVMs are also inhibiting Afghanistan’s efforts to tap into its own natural resources. 
In particular, mining for minerals is considered the future of Afghanistan, with hope 
that projects will lead to many jobs, electricity and new infrastructure. 
The Aynak copper deposit in Loghar Province was discovered in 1974 and is 
estimated to contain 11.3 million tonnes of copper. The project is expected to 
provide a significant boost to the Afghan economy. The Ministry of Mines of the 
Islamic Republic of Afghanistan contracted a Chinese company (MCC) to develop 
and extract copper from the mine.57 In addition to operating the copper mine and 
54 Interview with Mine Action Coordination Centre of Afghanistan Director, April 2013
55 Interview with MACCA, March 2014
56 Interview with Mine Action Coordination Centre of Afghanistan Director, April 2013
57 Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, Request for an extension of the deadline 
for completing the destruction of APMs in mined areas in accordance with Article 5 under the 
Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of APMs and 
on Their Destruction, 31 August 2012, http://www.macca.org.af/macca/?page_id=171, p. 4
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paying large taxes to the Afghan government (USD 350–450 million per year), 
the Chinese company also planned to build homes benefiting approximately 400 
villagers in the area. The project itself will indirectly benefit 30,000 people through 
jobs and infrastructure.58
At the outset of the project, the ministries involved did not adequately consult 
with MACCA, as previous national surveys (LIS and Polygon Survey) had not 
captured contamination information in that area. Six months into the work, the 
Chinese company contacted MACCA to report mine contamination. Surveys later 
revealed large areas affected by both APMs and AVMs, including MK7 and TC6. 
Work had to be delayed and extra costs were incurred. While the mining project 
itself will continue, because of the extent of landmine contamination – including 
AVMs – that needed to be cleared, the planned homes were not built, due to 
insufficient funds.59 
Conclusion
As Afghanistan works to stabilise its society and strengthen its economy 
through important new infrastructure projects such as rail networks and mineral 
resource development, AVMs have had a demonstrated impact on these projects 
at many levels. AVMs also continue to deny access to valuable land for the 
country’s agriculture-dependent population. On top of this, civilian casualties 
from AVMs continue to occur in the context of housing development, use of 
vehicles or construction machinery, and within Afghanistan’s migrating nomadic 
communities. 
Minimum metal AVM weapons have particularly contributed to prolonging the 
negative impacts of past conflicts on today’s humanitarian and developmental 
efforts. Mines which have evaded surveys, and even clearance operations, have 
forced Afghanistan and donors to spend extra time and resources developing 
more effective clearance methods to tackle this challenge in the country’s 
unique environmental conditions. These factors all contribute to the severe and 
multifaceted impact of AVMs in Afghanistan.
58 Interview with Mine Action Coordination Centre of Afghanistan, 9 March 2014
59 Ibidem
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CAMBODIA 
While still bearing a heavy burden of contamination by landmines and ERW from 
its past, Cambodia is in the midst of an important phase of infrastructure and 
economic development as it seeks to become a fully integrated member of the 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the international community.
 Beyond increasing agricultural production in many different areas, Cambodia 
is seeking to rehabilitate land formerly mined or covered with ERW in order to 
carry out large infrastructure projects and attract foreign direct investment. Mine 
clearance is thus seen as essential for the economic development of sectors 
including tourism, irrigation and energy production.60
As Cambodia pursues these development goals, the threat of AVMs has grown. 
The increase in the number of farmers using mechanical tractors, civilians using 
vehicles and workers using heavy construction equipment has led to a stark 
increase in the number of AVM-related civilian casualties in recent years, so much 
so that this total now surpasses the number of APM casualties.
Cambodia has banned mines other than anti-personnel mines in national law 
by choosing not to disaggregate APM and AVM types in its national legislation 
implementing the AP Mine Ban Treaty.61 Cambodia is party to both the AP Mine 
Ban Treaty and the CCW APII prohibiting mines, booby-traps and other devices.
The Cambodia Mine Action Authority (CMAA) and the Cambodia Mine Action 
Centre (CMAC), as well as other international organisations working to address 
the country’s demining challenge, including HALO Trust and the Mines Advisory 
Group (MAG), provided instrumental support in assembling this case study.
A 45 year-old male, his son aged 13 and daughter aged 12 were killed when 
their buffalo-cart loaded with wood ran over an old AVM in northwestern 
Cambodia’s Oddor Meanchey province in July 2013. The family had been 
returning from the forest where they had been collecting wood to build a 
house. The two buffalo were also killed.62
 
60 Interview with Cambodia Mine Action Authority, 8 July 2013
61 Ibidem
62 Source: http://english.cntv.cn/20130731/104241.shtml
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Overview	of	anti-vehicle	mine	presence
Cambodia’s heavy contamination by landmines and ERW is the result of the 
protracted regional and internal conflicts that engulfed it for over 30 years. Even 
after 20 years of demining, contamination still poses a heavy humanitarian and 
economic burden on the country.
AVM contamination is concentrated in, but not limited to, the northwestern region of 
the country, with the most affected province being Battambang.63 Other provinces 
severely affected by AVMs include Banteay Meanchey and Pailin. The extensive 
contamination in the rice and cassava producing regions along the Cambodia-
Thailand border has served as a great impediment to agricultural expansion there.64
It is reported that 21,582 AVMs, 930,826 APMs, and 2,184,797 ERW have been 
recovered and destroyed since mine action started in Cambodia in 1992. In the last 
five years, there have been 324 casualties resulting from APMs, 750 from ERW 
(including cluster munitions) and 283 from AVMs.65 Although the number of AVMs 
is significantly lower than the number of APMs in Cambodia, in recent years there 
have been more casualties per annum resulting from AVMs than from APMs.
FIGURE	14
 MAP OF THE NORTHWESTERN REGION OF CAMBODIA WHERE AVM 
 CONTAMINATION IS MOST SEVERE, 2008–2012
Source: Cambodia Mine Action Authority
63 Interview with Cambodia Mine Action Centre, 8 July 2013
64 Ibidem
65 Statement by Cambodia on MOTAPM at Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, 
Meeting of States Parties, November 2012
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National data collection system and AVM data handling
Cambodia is in the process of finalising a new national baseline survey (BLS) 
aggregated from local knowledge and incident data. Figures 14 and 15 illustrate 
its findings as of mid-2013. The survey found that over 68 square kilometres of 
land is suspected to contain AVMs alone and over 300 square kilometres of land 
is contaminated by mixed AVM and APM minefields. 
Local knowledge and reported incidents form the basis for the national BLS. 
Because this method relies on knowledge of contamination through sightings 
or past incidents, the BLS process is particularly prone to missing AVMs. 
Communities can be unaware of AVMs if vehicles never cross their land, and 
for this reason there are still frequent incidents in areas outside those marked in 
the BLS.66
66 Interview with Cambodia Mine Action Centre, 8 July 2013
FIGURE	15 
BASELINE SURVEY RESULTS SHOWING AVM CONTAMINATION (A3) 
 AND MIXED ANTI-VEHICLE AND ANTI-PERSONNEL CONTAMINATION (A2) 
 AS OF MID-2013
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History	of	anti-vehicle	mine	use	
Under the leadership of Pol Pot, the Khmer Rouge (KR) ruled Cambodia from 1975 
to 1979. Its policies lead to mass famine and genocide of the Cambodian people. 
Even whilst in power, the KR deployed a limited number of AVMs around the areas 
of Phnom Penh, Battambang and Banteay Meanchey as a defence against possible 
anti-regime revolts and to protect itself from brewing tensions with Vietnam. 
The true proliferation of landmines in Cambodia did not begin until 1979 when 
Vietnam eventually invaded Cambodia, overthrew the KR and occupied the 
country for the next decade. As Vietnam intervened, the KR retreated to, and 
fought to defend, base camps along the northwestern border near Thailand. During 
this time, the KR began using AVMs to surround their strongholds for defensive 
purposes. The KR also mined tracks and roads used by the new Cambodian 
government and Vietnamese troops, typically to cut off access to ammunition 
and to disrupt the transportation of other supplies between Vietnamese military 
bases. With the gradual success of these tactics, the KR moved to the offensive 
| Yellow posts marking recently cleared AVMs (TM-46) and 
| APMs at a HALO Trust demining site in Battambang province.
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use of AVMs, such as laying them in relatively open spaces in dense forest (where 
vehicles had to pass) and in proximity to water sources.67
Vietnam also used AVMs as defensive weapons against the KR, keeping some 
(but not complete) records of their use, and even marking some minefields 
before later withdrawing from Cambodia. After the Vietnamese military had 
pushed the KR out of Cambodia and across the border to Thailand, in 1984–85, 
it used AVMs as defensive weapons in attempts to prevent the KR from returning 
to the country. The Vietnamese used forced labour of up to 100,000 people to 
lay a barrier minefield along the 750 km-long Cambodia-Thailand border. This 
infamous mine belt became known as the K5. Most of the mines in the belt are 
APMs, with a smaller number of AVMs spread throughout. The KR ultimately 
stole many of the K5 mines and then used them against the Vietnamese forces 
that laid them.68
Even after the Vietnamese withdrawal, internal fighting between factions within 
Cambodia continued, as did the laying of AVMs. The Cambodian national army 
distributed AVMs to regional commanders to use freely in their respective 
regions. There were no reports, records or verification back to the capital 
concerning use.69 
The types of AVMs most commonly used in Cambodia were the TM 46 (both 
Chinese and Russian versions), TM 57 and TM 62. The KR mainly acquired its 
AVMs from China; the Cambodian government from the Soviet Union and East 
Germany; and Vietnam from Czechoslovakia. Russian-made TM 46 AVMs are 
found throughout northern regions of Cambodia, and the Chinese TM 46 is the 
most commonly found AVM type in the country as a whole.70
There are very few records of the deployment of AVMs during Cambodia’s 
decades of conflict. The old indications recorded for localisation, such as 
‘along the road’ or ‘near the big tree’ largely disappeared due to changes in the 
landscape from deforestation and the disappearance of old roads. By the time 
the refugees returned to their land after the end of the conflict, old roads were 
often hidden by thick vegetation, leaving people with no sense of where to 
expect contamination. Furthermore, there are few maps or records documenting 
the locations of old roads.71 
67 Interview with HALO Trust Cambodia, 11 July 2013
68 Ibidem
69 Ibidem
70 Interview with Cambodia Mine Action Centre, 8 July 2013
71 Interview with HALO Trust Cambodia, 11 July 2013
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Common tactics and configurations of AVMs in Cambodia included: (i) several 
AVMs stacked on top of each other in order to destroy tanks rather than temporarily 
immobilise them; (ii) a single AVM augmented by APMs around or directly on top of 
it in order to increase sensitivity and to protect it; (iii) AVMs laid in close proximity in 
the shape of a triangle to increase the chance of capturing a vehicle manoeuvering 
around a single mine; and (iv) an AVM buried deep in the ground with an upright 
stick between the mine and the ground, sensitising the mine while avoiding 
detection. This was a reactive KR tactic when they discovered that Vietnamese 
deminers detected and removed AVMs deployed at a shallower depth. Deminers 
have also found improvised AVMs made using other types of explosives.72
Casualties	from	anti-vehicle	mines	
AVM casualties are on the rise and have outnumbered casualties from APMs in 
recent years. There were 908 recorded AVM-related civilian casualties between 
2000 and mid-2013, compared to only 242 during the twenty years between 
1979 and 1999.73 While this stark rise and contrast can be partially attributed 
| An AVM at a HALO Trust demining site found with several  
| APMs positioned directly on top of it.
72 Interview with MAG, 8 July 2013; Interview with Cambodia Mine Action Centre, 8 July 2013
73 AVM Basic Impact Survey Conducted by GICHD and SIPRI, 2013 and Cambodia Mine Victim 
Information System Olap Cube
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to poor data collection in early years, there is a chance that it reflects reality 
to a certain extent: most civilians in northwestern Cambodia were forced out 
of their villages when the KR occupied and mined the area during the 1980s, 
and civilians have only returned to these areas in large numbers in more recent 
years. Even more recently, farmers have begun to employ mechanized farming 
equipment at greater levels, thereby disturbing AVMs that have previously gone 
unnoticed. 
In Cambodia, the most common civilian activities at the time of AVM incidents 
have been travelling and farming, with travellers far outnumbering all other 
categories (Figure 16). Drilling into the occupational categories of these travellers 
(Figure 17), the large majority of travellers are farmers, drivers and children.
Many AVM casualty incidents in Cambodia occur due to the increased use of small 
tractors known as rotavators. These vehicles are used in farming by attaching a 
plough, and as a means of local transport by exchanging the plough with a trailer 
bed. In this configuration, this off-road-capable vehicle is used for transporting 
workers out to the fields, family transportation, or transporting goods from farms 
to markets or to export centres. 
| A rotavator in Battambang district of Cambodia.
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An example of this type of accident occurred in September 2012, when seven 
people riding in the trailer bed of the rotavator were killed by the blast of a 
TM 46 AVM. The driver was severely injured but survived, which is a common 
pattern because the rotavator driver’s seat sticks out in front of the trailer and 
back wheels, which normally trigger the mine due to the heavy load of people or 
goods carried in the trailer.
In this case, the driver was transporting seven of his relatives back from a market 
near another village, and the group included three of his children. The incident 
occurred in the middle of a road that had been used by these communities for 
many years. Villagers are still not sure why the incident occurred, but speculated 
that the mine may have shifted during the rainy season. The BLS had identified 
the road and the surrounding area as safe given that the area had previously been 
cleared in 1993–95. The BLS result had been shared with the affected village in 
2012. The incident highlighted a gap in the existing methodology in identifying 
AVM contaminated land, as well as in mine risk-awareness communication to 
local populations.74 Following the incident, CMAC cleared 2,000m of the road. 
Authorities in Cambodia attest that the country requires mine risk-awareness 
education specifically for AVMs, but it is currently not conducted. 
A similar accident occurred in November 2010, again with a TM 46, when 
13 people riding on a rotavator trailer, along with a load of chillies, were killed as 
the driver steered slightly off the road to avoid a pothole. Only the driver survived 
the incident.75 
Accidents such as these have resulted in a very specific fear of AVMs in the region. 
Communities are more confident that APMs have been cleared, but suspect that 
there may be unknown AVMs in the area and are afraid to expand agricultural 
production. Families in the Battambang village grow rice and vegetables (cassava, 
corn and sesame), and they affirm that once land surrounding the village is cleared 
of mines, they intend to use it to expand their production of crops.76
Casualty data collection and AVM data handling in Cambodia
Cambodia has a very robust data collection system to gather, analyse and learn 
from casualty data. The system could provide a good example to other states 
and enabled this study’s research team to better understand the specific impact 
of AVMs in the region given the level of detail in reporting. The Cambodia Mine 
74 Interview with AVM survivor, 10 July 2013
75 Ibidem
76 Ibidem
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Victim Information System (CMVIS) was established in 1995 by the Cambodian 
Red Cross, with funding from UNICEF and Handicap International. The system 
was later handed over to Cambodian authorities in 2008, which transferred it to 
the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) in 2011.77
The official process for reacting to an accident begins with a Red Cross volunteer 
reporting to the area to collect basic information on the event and victims. A CMAA 
field officer then conducts follow-up interviews with survivors and witnesses, fills 
in the standard forms for the CMVIS database and informs demining operators 
of the accident. The CMVIS team then reviews the data and may ask the field 
officer questions for clarification or verification.78 The goal is always to flesh out 
all details of the accident, including what the victim was doing at the time, his 
or her occupation and other personal details. These details are loaded into the 
CMVIS database and publically distributed in the form of monthly reports and 
OLAP Cubes on the CMVIS website.
Importantly, Cambodia’s casualty data reporting system calls upon operators to 
specify whether the type of mine was an AVM or APM by checking the appropriate 
box in the victim report form, allowing the CMAA to better understand the 
increasing number of casualties that AVMs are causing. However, the procedure 
does not require identification of the type of AVM which caused the incident, 
leaving some ambiguity on which models and which features of the mines may 
be to blame in different areas.
CMVIS costs approximately USD 100,000 per year to operate. The CMAA reports 
that this is the minimum level of resources needed to run a network that allows 
the CMVIS to capture relevant casualty data throughout the country and better 
target clearance efforts.79
77 Interview with Cambodia Mine Action Authority, 9 July 2013
78 Ibidem
79 Ibidem
76 | Case studies
| Cambodia’s Mine and ERW Incident Report that allows for  
| easy distinction of AVM incident from APM incidents.
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FIGURE	16
 
AVM VICTIMS BY ACTIVITY AT THE TIME OF THE ACCIDENT,  
 2005–2013 (assembled with CMVIS data)
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FIGURE	17
 
OCCUPATIONS OF VICTIMS CATEGORISED AS TRAVELLING AT 
 THE TIME OF AVM ACCIDENTS, 2005–2013 (assembled with CMVIS data)
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Despite the CMVIS system’s extensive coverage, there is still a perception that not 
all incidents get recorded, especially because injuries and deaths can be reported 
much later when clearance teams come to an area marked in the BLS. Cambodia’s 
ambition is to have national coverage of mine victim reporting, and the Cambodian 
mine action authorities believe that a common terminology between internal 
ministries will be necessary to achieve nationwide mine data coverage.80
Developmental	impact	of	anti-vehicle	mines
The robust and detailed casualty data collection system in Cambodia has allowed 
authorities to observe a distinct increase in AVM-related incidents in recent years. 
The details associated with the data show that the increase is largely due to 
increased development throughout the country, primarily in the agricultural sector. 
Beyond the casualties themselves, the mere observation of the increase in AVM 
incidents by local communities is inhibiting development progress in several ways. 
In the northwest, observing the rise in incidents involving tractor users has increased 
the perceived threat of AVM contamination. Some local communities choose to stick 
to using the less effective tools of cows and manual labour to farm their land even if 
this means smaller yields. Another example is that many farming operations in the 
region rely on villagers renting tractors to conduct farm work, and some suppliers 
are not willing to rent equipment to farmers in AVM contaminated areas.81
The Mine Action Planning Unit (MAPU) is responsible for post-clearance monitoring 
(PCM). The CMAA trains all PCM staff and has designed a standard questionnaire. 
MAPU has three staff dedicated to PCM in northwestern Battambang, a province 
heavily contaminated by AVMs. PCM of 725 plots of land cleared in 2011 took place 
between October 2012 and February 2013, and results showed that by far the most 
common use of new land is for agriculture. Ten years ago, PCM staff reported the 
most common use of cleared land was for resettlement of refugees and IDPs.82 
Throughout the Cambodian government, AVM clearance is beginning to be seen 
as an increasingly important development requirement. While APMs remain a 
clearance priority due to international treaty obligations, as Cambodia’s national 
strategy is to expand exports (particularly rice) to new overseas markets (such as 
Europe’s), AVM clearance is seen as an obstacle that must be surmounted in order 
to reach the country’s production targets.83 
80 Interview with Cambodia Mine Action Authority, 9 July 2013
81 Interview with UNDP, 8 July 2013
82 Interview with Cambodia Mine Action Authority, National Project Officer, 10 July 2013
83 Interview with MAG, 8 July 2013
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Beyond agriculture, AVM contamination has also presented obstacles to 
large-scale projects such as the expansion of irrigation and power schemes. 
The Government of Cambodia requires all prospective large-scale construction 
projects to first survey the land for contamination. The company involved must pay 
for the survey, and this factor has occasionally deterred potential foreign investors.84
AVMs also have an influence on Cambodia’s tourism sector, which has begun to 
grow thanks to recent years of stability in the country. Authorities say they take 
pains to inform those of the estimated three to four million visitors per year who 
rent cars or drivers about the risks of AVMs and other types of ERW. There is a 
pervasive fear that any tourist involvement in an incident in Cambodia might have 
a lasting and severe impact on the sector.85 
In terms of clearance, demining operators are beginning to see a marked increase 
in requests to clear AVM threats. MAG, an international NGO focused mainly 
on APM clearance in Cambodia, reports an increase in requests from local 
communities to clear AVMs as reactions to increased AVM incidents in their 
areas. MAG reports that accidents involving AVMs primarily occur in areas without 
APMs, as people are unaware of mine contamination. 
MAG runs clearance operations incorporating manual, mechanical and Mine 
Detection Dog (MDD) techniques. The large vehicles that MAG uses to clear dense 
vegetation cannot be used in areas with AVMs given that an AVM would damage 
the machine, and donors therefore will not allow the risk. Beyond this challenge, 
MAG states that AVMs deployed together with APMs are the most expensive to 
clear as it requires clearance in stages, using multiple methods and techniques.86 
Conclusion
Overall, as Cambodia works to recover from its past and toward greater integration 
with the regional and international community, the presence of AVMs has been 
shown to be a factor significantly slowing processes of recovery and growth. 
AVMs continue to elude Cambodia’s comprehensive survey efforts given that 
some communities do not become aware of their presence until it is too late. 
Despite the fact that the number of AVMs in Cambodia is significantly lower 
than the number of APMs, in the past few years, AVMs have killed more civilians 
than APMs. 
84 Interview with Cambodia Mine Action Authority, National Project Officer, 10 July 2013
85 Interview with Cambodia Mine Action Centre, 8 July 2013
86 Interview with Mines Advisory Group, 8 July 2013
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Beyond this threat, with villages choosing to avoid mechanised farming out of fear 
of hitting an AVM, and cases of foreign investment in the country’s infrastructure 
projects being deterred, Cambodians can point to a variety of reasons – other 
than casualty counts – for their decision to make AVMs illegal in their country and 
prevent these weapons from affecting future generations.87
SOUTH SUDAN
South Sudan gained its independence from Sudan on 9 July 2011, but only after 
a decades-long civil war which took the lives of two million people. The Compre-
hensive Peace Agreement signed between the Sudan People’s Liberation 
Movement (SPLM) and the Government of Sudan, in January 2005, included the 
right of Southern Sudan to conduct a referendum on its independence. 
Peace has nonetheless been fragile in South Sudan, partly caused by tensions 
with the north, and partly by internal fragmentation. On 15 December 2013, 
South Sudan relapsed into conflict. Fighting between the government forces 
and opposition groups caused over 1,000 deaths and displaced some 738,000 
people internally in addition to 130,400 people who fled to neighbouring states. 
The situation in the country remains volatile despite the signing of a cessation of 
hostilities agreement on 23 January 2014.88 
87 Interview with Cambodia Mine Action Authority, 12 July 2013
88 UNHCR spokesperson Melissa Fleming, press briefing, 14 Feb. 2014, Palais des Nations in Geneva, 
http://www.unhcr.org/52fdfcad9.html
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As the world’s newest sovereign state, South Sudan faces tremendous political 
and economic challenges. The economy, which is extremely dependent on oil 
revenues, has been vulnerable to conflicts over the use of Sudan’s pipelines and 
oil export facilities.89 In parts of South Sudan, up to 90 per cent of the households 
depend primarily on agriculture and livestock for their subsistence.90 
Although by no means the only cause of instability and underdevelopment in 
South Sudan, landmine contamination further challenges state-building and 
development efforts. Both APMs and AVMs have been used extensively in South 
Sudan, and over 30 different models of AVMs have been found in the country 
to date. This variation and unpredictability in the contamination deepens the 
challenge of clearance and recovery. This chapter focuses specifically on the AVM 
presence in the country and analyses the impact of contamination on civilian life, 
development efforts and clearance operations. As a newly sovereign state, South 
Sudan has acceded to the AP Mine Ban Treaty, but has not yet joined the CCW or 
the Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM).
The South Sudan National Mine Action Authority, United Nations Mine Action 
Centre and a number of mine action operators including the Norwegian People’s 
Aid (NPA), Mine Tech International (MTI), G4S and Mechem provided instrumental 
support in assembling this case study.
 
A bus carrying civilians exploded after it drove over an AVM in Juba, 
South Sudan,in October 2011. The accident resulted in 20 fatalities, including  
four children.91 
Overview	of	anti-vehicle	mine	presence
South Sudan is heavily contaminated by landmines and ERW, with widespread 
presence of both APMs and AVMs. All ten states in South Sudan are contaminated 
by AVMs to various degrees, though Eastern Equatoria, Central Equatoria and 
89 The Guardian, ‘South Sudan: in numbers’, http://www.theguardian.com/global-development/
datablog/2012/jul/09/south-sudan-in-numbers-key-statistics
90 African Development Bank, South Sudan: An Infrastructure Action Plan. A Program for Sustained 
Strong Economic Growth, 2013, p. 132
91 Source: http://reliefweb.int/report/south-sudan-republic/un-says-bus-mine-blast-south- 
sudan-killed-20
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Jonglei are especially affected. Some northern regions of South Sudan are 
also heavily contaminated by AVMs, given that many were laid as Sudanese 
government forces retreated from Southern Sudan.92 
FIGURE	18
 
IDENTIFIED AVM HAZARDS IN SOUTH SUDAN, AS OF SEPTEMBER 2013
Source: South Sudan NMAA
The UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS) is currently responsible for coordinating 
demining in South Sudan, together with the developing South Sudan National 
Mine Action Authority (NMAA), and constantly finds new areas to clear. In 2012, 
the majority of the new tasks involved AVMs. Due to the expansion in the number 
of hazardous zones, and new information coming in from clearance operations, 
UNMAS does not know the full extent of South Sudan’s contamination.93 
92 Interview with United Nations Mine Action Service, Juba, 4 Nov. 2013
93 Ibidem
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No maps or records of landmine contamination were kept during the Sudanese 
civil war.91 Mine clearance therefore depends on local knowledge and mine 
encounters, including incidents. IDPs and refugees returning to South Sudan 
often find mines upon their resettlement, and mine incidents and casualties are 
still frequent.95
UNMAS and the Government of Sudan commissioned a landmine impact survey in 
South Sudan in 2003 (then still a part of Sudan) in order to assist in setting priorities 
for mine clearance for the newly established national mine action programme. 
The survey, carried out between 2005 and 2009, showed that states in the 
future South Sudan consisted of a range of low to medium and highly affected 
communities. The impact survey was not fully comprehensive in its coverage, due 
to difficulties in accessing certain areas, partly because of insecurity. Importantly 
for this study, the survey did not make a distinction between AVMs and other 
types of landmines.96 
When the 2005 Peace Agreement was signed, many roads in South Sudan were 
impassable due to landmines, especially AVMs. Roads leading to Uganda, Kenya, 
the Democratic Republic of Congo and Ethiopia were all mined, causing major 
obstacles for returning refugees and IDPs, as well as for delivery of emergency aid 
and other resources. So far, 22,000 km of roads have been cleared of landmines, 
including most of the country’s major roads. However, smaller roads are still 
contaminated and, as a result, many rural communities remain isolated. As an 
example, three roads in Eastern Equatoria state are still not in use due to AVMs. 
Even some roads in Central Equatoria state (where the capital Juba is located) are 
contaminated with AVMs.97
Reports of the continued use of mines (both APM and AVM) in South Sudan 
continue to surface, though the exact users remain unclear. Recent reports have 
pointed to use of AVMs by rebel forces in Unity state and Jonglei state in the 
areas of Khorflus and Khorwai. One particular report pointed to use by the South 
Sudan Liberation Army (SSLA) – a rebel faction – that reportedly laid mines in 
Unity state.98
94 Interview with United Nations Mine Action Service, Juba, 4 Nov. 2013
95 Interview with South Sudan National Mine Action Authority, Juba, 4 Nov. 2013
96 Survey Action Center, Landmine Impact Survey: Republic of Sudan, 2010,  
http://www.sac-na.org/pdf_text/sudan/SDN_FinalReport.pdf
97 Interview with South Sudan National Mine Action Authority, Juba, 4 Nov. 2013
98 Landmine Monitor, South Sudan Country Profile, Mine Ban Policy (updated 25 November 2013) 
http://www.the-monitor.org/index.php/cp/display/region_profiles/theme/3190
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CONTINUED USE OF AVMs IN SOUTH SUDAN  
AS REPORTED IN LANDMINE MONITOR 99
A number of reports have surfaced in recent years regarding the possible 
continued laying of landmines, including AVMs.
• In Unity state, there were several reports of AVM use in 2011, claiming 
multiple casualties including in May, August, September, and October. 
[Landmine Monitor, South Sudan Country Profile, Mine Ban Policy, 
Updated 25 November 2013.]
•  In June 2011 the Southern Sudan Mine Action Authority expressed 
concern at new civilian deaths from what seemed to be newly-laid AP 
and AVMs. [Statement of South Sudan, Mine Ban Treaty Standing 
Committee on Mine Clearance, Geneva, 23 June 2011.]
• A representative of the UN Mine Action Office (UNMAO) Southern Sudan 
told media that evidence indicates rebel militia groups were laying mines 
and said, ‘We’ve seen an increase in mine incidents and mine accidents 
over the past six months or so and in many areas we think there are a lot 
of alleged cases of re-mining. We can’t prove it because we haven’t seen 
it but anecdotal evidence indicates that these are newly laid, not old mines.’ 
[Maggie Flick, ‘Landmines in Southern Sudan,’ Huffington Post, 4 June 
2011, citing an interview with Tim Horner, Deputy Director of the UNMAO 
in Southern Sudan.]
• In August 2011, five people were killed and 21 seriously injured in two 
separate AVM incidents. The governor of Unity state condemned the 
mine use, which it said was carried out by rebels led by James Gai Yoach, 
who have broken away from SSLA following the acceptance of a cease-
fire agreement with the government of South Sudan. [Bonifacio Taban 
Kuich, ‘Landmines kill 5 and injure 21 in South Sudan’s Unity state,’ 
Sudan Tribune (Bentiu), 23 August 2011.]
• In November 2011, a UN Mine Action and Coordination Centre (UNMACC) 
representative told media that routes leading into and out of the state 
capital Bentiu were suspected to be mined. [‘Relentless Use of Landmines 
in South Sudan Sparks Fear,’ Voice of America, 21 November 2011.] 
• In December 2011, a UNMACC representative said that it was increasing 
efforts to unblock aid and trade routes in Unity state because ‘the re-mining 
has shut down most of the state.’ [‘Amputees reap bitter fruits of separation 
in Sudan state,’ mysinchew.com, 17 December 2011.]
99 Condensed from Landmine Monitor (updated 25 November 2013)  
http://www.the-monitor.org/index.php/cp/display/region_profiles/theme/3190
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• In 2011 and 2012, the ICBL expressed concern at ‘alarming reports’ 
of new landmine use by NSAGs in South Sudan, but noted it was not 
possible to determine who was responsible or whether AP mines  
in addition to AVMs had been laid. [Statement of ICBL, Mine Ban 
Treaty Standing Committee on the General Status and Operation of the 
Convention, Geneva, 20 June 2011. Ibid., 25 May 2012.]
• In January 2012, a former senior SSLA member interviewed by Amnesty 
International admitted that their forces had laid AVMs on Unity state roads 
expected to be used by SPLA forces, but denied that SSLA forces had 
laid AP landmines. According to the former SSLA member, ‘We had some 
landmines but we kept many of them back. We sent intelligence guys to 
lay down anti-tank mines, and then attract SPLA forces to them.’ [Amnesty 
International, ‘South Sudan: Overshadowed Conflict,’ 28 June 2012, p. 23.]
• The Small Arms Survey documented newly-laid Chinese manufactured 
T-72 AVMs, reportedly laid by the South Sudan Liberation Army (SSLA) 
around Mayom in Unity state. [Small Arms Survey, Sudan Human Security 
Baseline Assessment, ‘Anti-tank and anti-personnel mines in Unity and 
Jonglei states,’ 5 March 2012.]
• In June 2013, a resident in Sudan’s White Nile state told a South Sudan 
media outlet that ‘armed rebels’ planted landmines in an area from Wadakona, 
a village in South Sudan’s Upper Nile state to the border with Sudan’s White 
Nile state. After a farmer died when his tractor hit a mine, the listener said, 
‘People are now avoiding using vehicles for fear of landmines.’ [‘Landmines 
kill and maim civilians on Sudan – South Sudan border’: source,’ 
Radio Tamazuj, 19 June 2013.]
• The NMAA conducted a fact-finding mission in June–July 2013 to 
engage with civil authorities in the states of Jonglei, Upper Nile, Unity, 
and Western Bahr El Ghazal. The NMAA engaged in discussions with the 
Governor and the Deputy Governor as well as the Sector and Division 
Commanders from the SPLA. Both the civil authorities as well as the 
SPLA denied allegations of being involved in new mine laying activities. 
However, the SPLA confirmed that new mines had indeed been laid by 
rebel forces in Unity state and also in Jonglei state in the areas of Khorflus 
and Khorwai. [UNMAS has been unable to independently verify the 
allegations due to access restrictions to the alleged sites. Email from Lance 
Malin MBE, UNMAS, 14 October 2013.]
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National data collection system and AVM data handling
The national data collection system is a collaborative effort by several international 
demining operators reporting to UNMAS, which manages the Information 
Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA). Regional survey teams collect 
data on mines and UXO that they then send to the national authority. Community 
liaison teams also report to UNMAS based on the results from MRE programmes. 
UNMAS feeds the data into IMSMA. To facilitate local ownership of the database, 
UNMAS is currently training South Sudan National Mine Action Authority (NMAA) 
staff on how to use the software and reporting mechanisms. 
The most accurate information on contamination comes from completion reports. 
Demining operators write a completion report on each task, which they then 
submit to IMSMA. Reports specify the type of mine and the location, either 
identifying the location of a single mine (in case of a spot task) or a mine field (in 
case of a polygon task), and list the number of AVMs, APMs and UXO destroyed.100 
Mine action operators in South Sudan aim to distinguish AVMs from APMs in 
their survey, clearance and incident reporting. However, the reports submitted 
by demining organisations vary in their level of detail. Some only report clearance 
at the polygon level, without providing the coordinates of the individual mines 
cleared. While some organisations do provide this information, because of this 
variation it is not possible to provide a map of all AVMs cleared in the country. 
In addition, some of the reporting forms in use allow for free text entry in areas of 
the form identifying the type of hazard – this variation can make it more difficult to 
later sift out information regarding the specific types (APM versus AVM) or models 
of landmines encountered from the larger database.
100 Interview with G4S Juba, 5 Nov. 2013
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The information submitted in incident reports also varies depending on what 
information is available to the investigator. UNMAS reports that it is standard 
practice to try to identify the type of device and determine if there are more 
hazards around the site of the incident. However, the device type may not always 
be identifiable, e.g. if there is nothing left of the device or if an investigation was 
not possible due to inaccessibility. 
According to one operator, unless one sees a mine or an incident, it is difficult to 
differentiate between different kinds of contamination, and basic training may be 
required to identify the correct type of munition, e.g. distinguishing an AVM from 
a RPG.101 However, in the case of a detonation, deminers may be able to tell that 
an AVM caused an incident based on signature characteristics, such as the crater 
size and the presence of mine remnants. 
The survey and hazard form, which is completed before a clearance task, is often 
based on local reports and knowledge, and untrained interviewees may not 
be able to distinguish different devices from one another. Therefore, the most 
accurate reports identifying devices are those completed post-clearance by 
demining operators.102
For these reasons and uncertainties, national AVM data in South Sudan remains 
incomplete, and data that is available on both contamination and incidents 
provides low estimates.
History	of	anti-vehicle	mine	use
AVMs were used by both sides during the Second Sudanese Civil War (1983–
2005), which was fought by Sudanese government forces and the south’s 
opposition army, the SPLA, whose political wing is now in government in 
South Sudan. 
AVMs were mainly used in South Sudan as part of guerrilla warfare. The SPLA 
used AVMs as a defensive weapon, in particular to impede road access to 
Sudanese government forces. The SPLA would place AVMs along transport 
routes, around their bases and in other strategic locations. Both belligerents 
would typically lay AVMs along the contested ‘buffer zone’ running between 
their opposing military bases. Very few tanks were used in Sudan during the war 
101 Interview with Mechem, Juba, 5 Nov. 2013.
102 Interview with United Nations Mine Action Service (IMSMA section), Juba, 5 Nov. 2013;  
 Interview with G4S Juba, 5 Nov. 2013.
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(around 20 in total) and the SPLA had none. AVMs were instead aimed at 
destroying the support vehicles carrying supplies and other logistics during the 
conflict. AVMs were considered an important weapon in this asymmetric conflict, 
especially for the militarily weaker SPLA. 
FIGURE	19
 
TYPES OF ANTI-VEHICLE MINES FOUND IN SOUTH SUDAN 
AKS TM 47
AT, TYPE 72MT TM 56
AVM-72 TM-44
GS MK IV TM-46 & TMN-46
GS MK VC TM-57
M12 TM-59
M15 TM-62M
M4 TM-62P
M46 TM46
M6 SERIES, HE TMA-5 & TMA-5A
MK 5 H.C. TYPE 59
MK 5(V), EP UKA-63
MK 7, MK 7/1, MK 7/4 & MK 7/7 VS-AT4
MK-4 VS2.2 AT
PMA-5 YAM-10
PRBM 3 YAM-5
PRM-3 pressure plate YAM-5K
TC-6, MODEL YM III
Source: South Sudan NMAA and UNMAS
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Demining operators have commonly reported that mines were seemingly 
laid arbitrarily, with little patterns and very few records. This matches with 
reports that during the conflict, the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) 
had weak logistical support, and soldiers travelling on foot would often carry 
mines on their heads in stacks and distribute them irregularly.103 In some 
cases, different types of mines were often directly connected to one another 
on the ground (e.g. using a tripwire) so detonating one mine would set off 
the other.104
G4S operators in South Sudan have reported often finding AVMs located 
around bridges, as well as in typical ambush locations afforded by geographic 
features, where they were placed to strike a convoy. Operators also report 
that some mines were left in forests and elsewhere when foot soldiers found 
carrying them became too difficult.105
MTI also reports finding AVMs on roads or close to roads, close to bridges 
and in landscapes suitable for defensive positions.106 They have also 
commonly found AVMs beyond roads. Mines laid at checkpoints, for example, 
were left behind when the checkpoints moved. Other cases include finding 
AVMs surrounding bases of the belligerent groups, which could migrate and 
leave the mines behind. Even on the outskirts of Juba, close to the airport, 
farmers found AVMs when they started to cultivate the land. Mines are also 
found on old, overgrown roads, and although this AVM contamination has a 
more limited impact at the moment, it could cause problems in the future if 
such land is later developed.107 
A unique feature of the mine contamination in South Sudan is the wide 
variety of AVMs present, with over 30 different types found to date. The most 
commonly found AVMs in South Sudan include types from China, Russia, 
Italy, Belgium and the UK. The acquisition routes of these weapons, for both 
the SPLA and the Sudanese government are unclear. The SPLA’s supply 
included, but may not have been limited to, weapons captured from the 
Sudanese government. The Sudanese government might have had a more 
stable source of supply, possibly from China.
103 Interview with Mining Technologies International, Juba, 5 Nov. 2013
104 Interview with South Sudan National Mine Action Authority, Juba, 4 Nov. 2013
105 Interview with G4S Juba, 5 Nov. 2013
106 Interview with Mining Technologies International, Juba, 5 Nov. 2013
107 Interview with G4S Juba, 5 Nov. 2013
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Casualties	from	anti-vehicle	mines	and	casualty	data
Prior to the 2011 independence referendum, the number of AVM casualties 
reported was relatively low in South Sudan when compared to other states with 
similar levels of contamination. UNMAS and the Sudanese authorities’ national 
strategy was to primarily target road clearance. This benefitted the clearance 
of AVMs and is likely to have had an impact on lowering the number of AVM 
incidents. Although this demining strategy has undoubtedly shown results in the 
past decade, the financial costs of these operations have also been significant.
FIGURE	20
 AVM CASUALTIES IN SOUTH SUDAN, AS OF SEPTEMBER 2013
Since the beginning of mine action activities in South Sudan in 2004, national 
authorities have recorded 482 civilian casualties due to AVMs. They emphasise, 
however, that reported numbers of casualties are likely to be significantly less 
than the actual number, given that much of the country remains inaccessible to 
reporting efforts due to security concerns. 
| This map shows recorded civilian casualties in South Sudan from 2004 to 2013. 
| Authorities have emphasised that this data set is incomplete, especially in the northern 
| states, due to ongoing conflict and the inaccessibility of certain areas. Source: NMAA
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During 2007–10, the NMAA reported only a handful of casualties per year, but in 
2011 this increased to 112 reported AVM victims. That year, following increased 
tensions after the referendum, some 400,000–500,000 people moved into and 
across South Sudan.108 This great increase in casualties was most likely simply due to 
these large population movements as people fled conflict zones, with many refugees 
from the South Kordofan and Blue Nile states in Sudan fleeing into South Sudan. 
AVM incidents continue to take lives and injure civilians in South Sudan. Towards 
the end of 2013, there was, for example, an AVM incident in the area of Bentiu 
town in the north, close to the border with Sudan.109 
South Sudan employs a cooperative process for reporting on landmine incidents 
and collecting information. Following every landmine incident, the mine action 
operator closest to the location is sent to the site. The operator fills in an incident 
form and UNMAS staff follow-up on the incident with an investigation, including 
a visit to the site and interviews with survivors and witnesses.110 Non-fatal victim 
reports from AVM incidents are rare, since there are normally few survivors.111 
Although all UNMAS teams are capable of conducting investigations concerning 
landmines incidents, UNMAS sometimes cannot visit certain sites due to security 
concerns and inaccessibility due to heavy rains or remoteness. Furthermore, 
UNMAS does not have effective access to certain border areas. Parts of Jonglei 
state, for example, cannot be investigated, and incident report forms are only useful 
when trained personnel have access to the site.112 For these reasons, UNMAS 
suspects that a number of AVM or APM related casualties go unreported each year.
Developmental	impact	of	anti-vehicle	mines
AVM presence in South Sudan poses challenges to development in a number of 
areas. Up to this point, the country’s low population density and lower levels of 
mechanized agriculture partially explain South Sudan’s low casualty figures relative 
to the extent of mine contamination. The AVM threat may become even greater as 
the country’s population grows, the movement of people increases, the number of 
vehicles grows and as roads are used more frequently. As such, it is possible that 
the number of AVM incidents will rise as development progresses in South Sudan.113
108 Interview with United Nations Mine Action Service, Juba, 4 Nov. 2013
109 Interview with South Sudan National Mine Action Authority, Juba, 4 Nov. 2013
110 Ibidem
111 Interview with Mining Technologies International, Juba, 5 Nov. 2013
112 Interview with United Nations Mine Action Service, Juba, 4 Nov. 2013 
113 Interview with G4S Juba, 5 Nov. 2013
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FIGURE	21
  
NMAA RATED THE FOLLOWING AREAS AS SUFFERING ‘VERY SEVERE’  
 EFFECTS DUE TO AVMs IN THE BIS 
Road access for humanitarian aid
Road access for refugee return
Restoration of land for grazing livestock
Development of new areas for energy resource exploration
Key areas suffering from the impact of anti-vehicle mines
Resettlement and movement of people
Landmine contamination has affected the movement and resettlement of IDPs 
and refugees in South Sudan. In the 2008 landmine impact survey, 247,562 
IDPs and refugees were expected to resettle in Central Equatoria state alone.114 
After South Sudan gained independence in 2011, there was a sudden influx of 
Sudanese refugees from Sudan’s South Kordofan and Blue Nile states. Large 
movements of returnees continued in 2013.115 Since mid-December 2013, 
renewed conflict in South Sudan has internally displaced 738,000 people, and a 
further 130,400 have fled to neighbouring countries, primarily Ethiopia, Kenya, 
Sudan and Uganda.116 
Although data is incomplete, AVM incidents in South Sudan do at least partly 
correlate to an increase in the movement of large groups of people. The stark 
increase from five AVM casualties in 2010 to 112 AVM casualties in 2011 can be 
partially attributed to the swell in population movements that year as a result of 
the referendum. Looking toward the future, as IDPs from the most recent eruption 
of conflict in the country look to resettle, they may, for example, start to use old 
or smaller roads, and will be at risk of triggering AVMs that have not yet been 
documented due to inaccessibility or renewed mine laying.
114 Landmine Impact Survey – Sudan: Central and Western Equatoria States,  
 July 2008, p. 14, http://www.sac-na.org/pdf_text/sudan/GE_Report_Jul08.pdf
115 UNHRC, South Sudan, http://www.unhcr.org/pages/4e43cb466.html (accessed: 25 Feb. 2014)
116 UNHCR spokesperson Melissa Fleming, press briefing, 14 Feb. 2014,  
 Palais des Nations in Geneva, http://www.unhcr.org/52fdfcad9.html
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Agriculture and food production
The UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) states that South Sudan is 
enormously rich in natural resources, and with 95 percent of the population 
dependent on them for survival, it has significant potential for sustainable growth 
through agriculture. However, FAO’s satellite land cover survey showed that just 
4.5 percent of the available land was currently under cultivation.117 
Currently, much rural sector activity in South Sudan is focused on low-input, 
low-output subsistence agriculture instead of production for markets.118 Mine 
clearance priorities are access to water and firewood collection, land for cultivation 
and transport to remote villages. In the short term, most of the cleared land will be 
used for subsistence farming of crops such as cassava, maize, peanuts and other 
vegetables119 As this farming is most commonly done by hand in South Sudan, 
there are many cases where villagers have lived in AVM-contaminated land without 
detonating an AVM. However, in the longer term, when farming shifts from manual 
to mechanical tools and vehicles, this co-existence will no longer be possible.
AVMs also affect other areas of development and livelihood in the country. 
In Eastern Equatoria state (along the Torit road to Katri), minefields containing 
AVMs have hampered the development of tea plantations, timber production and 
sugarcane plantations. The limited timber sector in South Sudan could expand, 
and possibly make a more significant contribution to the economy, were it not for 
AVM contamination in these off-road areas that are more difficult to survey and 
clear.120 Dinka communities in northern areas including Jonglei and the Upper Nile 
are cattle herders and live off their livestock – they have repeatedly stated that they 
worry about mines as cattle have been known to activate AVMs.121 
Foreign Direct Investment 
The presence of AVMs in South Sudan has been a deterrent to Foreign Direct 
Investment in various sectors. Before even starting to plan a project, investors 
must get verification and a certificate from the NMAA that the area of interest has 
117 Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, ‘South Sudan naturally  
 endowed for sustainable growth through agriculture,’  
 http://www.fao.org/news/story/en/item/81693/icode/ 
118 African Development Bank, South Sudan: An Infrastructure Action Plan.  
 A Program for Sustained Strong Economic Growth, 2013, p. 131
119 Interview with Mining Technologies International, Juba, 5 Nov. 2013
120 Interview with United Nations Mine Action Service, Juba, 4 Nov. 2013
121 Interview with G4S Juba, 5 Nov. 2013
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been cleared of landmines. Known contamination has affected road development, 
building of power lines and the extractive industries.
Smaller foreign investment projects are particularly prone to being put off by 
AVMs, given the smaller budgets typically involved. For example, an Indian 
company expressed an interest in developing a sugar field, together with a refinery, 
in the border area between Eastern Equatoria and Jonglei states, but the investors 
pulled out due to landmine contamination that included AVMs.122 
In terms of major resource extraction projects, gold exploration in Eastern 
Equatoria is one area that has been affected by mine contamination.123 This state 
has therefore been listed as one of the priority areas in the national clearance 
strategy, as fear of mines remains a deterrent against new investments in gold 
prospecting.124 Oil and gas companies, on the other hand, are better prepared for 
potential contamination and have their own deminers. 
In general, as South Sudan moves to develop its economy, AVM contamination 
exists as yet another risk with the potential to deter private sector investment 
across these various industries.125 
Infrastructure 
Road clearance has been a top priority for UNMAS in South Sudan, with 
approximately 22,000 km of roads cleared over years of collaborative efforts. 
The landmine threat on roads in South Sudan is primarily caused by AVMs rather 
than APMs. The Juba-Bentiu road was previously closed due to AVMs, but has 
now been cleared, as is the case with many major roads in South Sudan.126 Before 
the outbreak of renewed conflict, clearance of all major roads in Eastern Equatoria 
was due to be completed in 2014, with the next priority being to clear side roads.127 
Road clearance has had a positive impact on many levels, facilitating access to 
more demining and aid, opening up trade and travel opportunities, and bringing 
access to education and healthcare to rural communities. In addition, the national 
railway line, connecting Babonosa in Sudan with Wau in South Sudan, was cleared 
of landmines in 2007 and is now open again for traffic.128 
122 Interview with United Nations Mine Action Service, Juba, 4 Nov. 2013
123 Interview with G4S Juba, 5 Nov. 2013
124 Interview with South Sudan National Mine Action Authority, Juba, 4 Nov. 2013
125 Interview with G4S Juba, 5 Nov. 2013
126 Interview with United Nations Mine Action Service, Juba, 4 Nov. 2013
127 Ibidem
128 Interview with South Sudan National Mine Action Authority, Juba, 4 Nov. 2013
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Despite progress made along main roads, South Sudan is still faced by AVM 
threats both alongside some major roads, as well as throughout smaller peripheral 
road networks. In the early years of clearance, emergency humanitarian demining 
clearance standards called for the clearing all major roads connecting key towns 
to a width of 8 m. In 2004–05, clearance standards issued by UNMAS changed 
to a width of 20–25 m in order to capture more of the contamination and allow 
for possible development alongside roads.129 
There have been a number of incidents alongside roads that were only cleared to a 
width of 8 m, and demining operators frequently find more AVMs next to cleared 
roads. NPA responded to a clearance request when a road construction company’s 
bulldozer detonated an AVM whilst laying a new road surface.130 Mechem staff 
reported on an AVM incident in which a bus detonated the mine on a road from 
Bentiu to Nhialdiu in Unity state in August 2011. The victims were aware of the 
contamination, but had no choice but to use the road as there was no alternative 
route.131
New use of AVMs also presents a continued threat as reports of new mine laying 
occasionally surface. In June 2013, a resident in Sudan’s White Nile state told a 
South Sudan media outlet that ‘armed rebels’ planted landmines in an area from 
Wadakona, a village in South Sudan’s Upper Nile state to the border with Sudan’s 
White Nile state. After a farmer died when his tractor hit a mine, the listener said, 
‘People are now avoiding using vehicles for fear of landmines.’ 132 
A closer look at the impact of anti-vehicle mines on communities  
in South Sudan 
The following examples are of sites visited by this study’s research team, which 
illustrate both the use and impact of AVMs.
Site visit 1: Lobonok
The research team visited a clearance site operated by NPA outside the town 
of Lobonok, in an area home to approximately 600 people. The area was 
contaminated with North Korean ATM 72 mines, and the site had been identified 
because of an AVM accident involving a bulldozer that had been widening the road 
129 Interview with Mechem, Juba, 5 Nov. 2013
130 Interview with NPA, 4 November 2013
131 Interview with Mechem, Juba, 5 Nov. 2013
132 ‘Landmines kill and maim civilians on Sudan – South Sudan border,’ Radio Tamazuj,  
 19 June 2013 via Landmine Monitor South Sudan Country Profile
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to Lobonok. The area had previously been part of one of the SPLA’s last major 
strongholds, and the road leading through a valley landscape was a good tactical 
setting for AVMs. AVMs were laid along the road, as well as in areas that would 
have allowed the enemy convoy to pass around an ambush point. 
The mine action operators reported that members of the community had been 
very eager to use the land. Farmers had even risked their lives by planting crops 
in areas still under clearance to take advantage of the fact that the land had been 
cleared of vegetation and tilled during demining.133
Site visit 2: Ayii
A second site visited during the investigation was near the Juba-Nimule highway, 
a major road between the capital and Uganda. AVMs were found near a former 
Sudanese Armed Forces base. Eight of the mines were found by a family in their 
cassava plantation just a few meters from the highway. It was reportedly a fairly 
common occurrence for villagers to find AVMs after having used the land for 
133 Interview with NPA, 4 November 2014
| An NPA landmine clearance site near Lobonok 
| containing North Korean ATM 72 mines.
98 | Case studies
quite some time without incident. So far, there has been little reported impact 
when the AVMs are found off the road like this given that heavy machinery is not 
commonly used. However, as communities develop and start to use vehicles and 
mechanised farming equipment, the presence of AVMs could have more serious 
consequences.
Site visit 3: Kuda
A third site visited during the study was the larger village area of Kuda, with 
a population of approximately 7,000 people. YM III AVMs were found in a 
defensive formation around a former SPLA base. The low metal content of 
these mines had clearly been problematic because the mines had been missed 
by a previous clearance operation in this area in 2008. UNMAS and NMAA 
are currently investigating this particular incident. In Kuda, as in many areas 
throughout South Sudan, the mines were laid in very close proximity to the 
villagers, with one actually having been found just outside the front door 
of a home. Villagers reported that a major reason why so few people had 
returned to resettle this area after the conflict ceased was due to the extensive 
contamination.
| The estimated boundaries of a suspected AVM field off  
| of a major road leading from Juba into Uganda.
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| A MineTech International demining site in Kuda with suspected AVM presence. 
| The red posts indicate boundaries marking mine presence.
| A MineTech International demining site in Kuda with suspected AVM presence. 
| Demining personnel use the red posts to indicate the boundaries of mine presence.
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Conclusion
South Sudan re-entered a period of civil conflict in early 2014, and it is not yet clear 
how long the instability may last, nor how much of the progress the country has 
made in terms of rebuilding, mine clearance and development might be undone. 
Up until now, the greatest impact of AVMs on South Sudan has been its burden 
on key road networks. The country therefore heavily prioritised major routes for 
clearance, and achieved great progress through the collective efforts of mine 
action personnel in the country. In spite of this progress, South Sudan continues 
to suffer from AVM incidents, with civilian casualties occurring on rural roads and 
alongside both major and periphery routes. In 2014, as communities displaced by 
the recent violence are forced to move along possibly unfamiliar paths, they will 
likely be at an increased risk to becoming victims of the still pervasive threat of 
AVMs in the country. 
South Sudan continues to experience the negative impacts of AVMs in areas 
ranging from distributing humanitarian aid to resettlement and to agriculture and 
animal husbandry. The country has little public infrastructure and a great deal 
of subsistence farming is currently conducted by hand. The possibility exists, 
therefore, that South Sudan has yet to experience the full impact of its AVM 
contamination, as some rural communities still manage to coexist with mines. 
Future infrastructure development projects or the increased use of mechanised 
farming practices may yet reveal remaining AVM contamination and this could 
slow South Sudan’s efforts to stabilise, progress in its development and eventually 
prosper.
CONCLUSIONS 
AND RECOMMENDATIONS
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Findings from this study show that the humanitarian and developmental impact 
of AVMs can increase in the aftermath of a conflict as a state progresses towards 
recovery. Factors in post-conflict development, such as the return and resettlement 
of populations, the gradual increase in the number of civilian vehicles for transport 
and farming, and new state infrastructure projects using heavy equipment, have 
all been hampered or inhibited by the presence of AVMs.
The significance of the negative impact of AVMs on stability and development 
should not be understated. In Cambodia, successful development is needed to 
sustain the country’s recovery from previous decades of conflict. In Afghanistan, 
poverty continues to fuel insurgent uprisings that threaten stability both 
domestically and regionally. In South Sudan, civil unrest has caused the country 
to slide back into conflict. While AVMs are certainly not the only challenge faced 
by these states, the data and examples collected in the context of this study 
demonstrate that residual AVM contamination is a significant factor inhibiting a 
more accelerated recovery and development process.
There is already a great deal of evidence available to demonstrate the negative 
humanitarian and developmental impact of AVMs on civilians, and this study 
has found that even this data remains significantly incomplete. Both the global 
overview and country case study investigations brought forth the fact that 
data gaps exist for a variety of reasons. In over half of the states surveyed in 
the context of this study, many states could not provide certain estimates of 
AVM contamination and casualty data simply because it was not effectively 
differentiated from APM data. There have also been historic lapses in 
contamination and casualty data collection due to conflict. To this day, sometimes 
surveyors are not able to gather data because they either cannot access insecure 
areas or because the AVM contamination goes unnoticed by communities without 
vehicles living in their midst.
Despite these difficulties, even more can be done to mitigate the impact of these 
weapons on civilians, as well as improve AVM data collection practices as detailed 
in the observations and recommendations below. This information stream will 
continue to inform and build the international community’s understanding of the 
significant negative impact of AVMs on civilians and states and how to effectively 
act in addressing this unequivocal challenge.
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GENERAL OBSERVATIONS 
AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Observation	1 Recommendation	1
AVMs are in many ways similar 
in design, function and impact 
to APMs, yet they are subject 
to different obligations under 
international law. Furthermore, their 
usage could contradict a number 
of humanitarian principles, 
including those of distinction and 
proportionality.
Discussions should continue 
on further regulating the use of 
AVMs to comply with existing IHL 
principles.
Observation	2 Recommendation	2
The case studies described in 
this report concurred that AVM 
contamination is much more likely 
to be missed by survey efforts than 
APM contamination. This is mainly 
due to the fact that rural populations 
in developing countries are less likely 
to trigger AVMs, as they are less 
likely to be using vehicles or heavy 
equipment. This AVM hazard thus 
becomes more of a risk for these 
countries in the long-term, with 
AVM contamination surfacing later 
to impede development and poverty 
reduction efforts.
States Parties to the CCW should 
abide by the requirement to record 
the geographic coordinates of 
mines and minefields, i.e. in APII 
of the CCW. In addition, further 
restrictions, including a prohibition, 
on the laying of AVMs outside 
perimeter marked areas would 
provide a clear cut and effective 
means to reduce the impact of 
AVMs on civilians. 
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Observation	3 Recommendation	3
Low metal AVMs are often missed 
by standard surveys, especially 
when planted alone. Despite 
deminers’ best efforts in a number 
of countries, many of these mines 
are still missed by modern clearance 
methods and continue to pose a 
great hazard to civilians attempting 
to develop their land.
If AVM production cannot be 
deterred or prevented, states should 
explore ways of ensuring that AVMs 
produced in the future include 
measures to enable detectability 
by humanitarian demining teams, 
including a minimum metal content 
specification.
Observation	4 Recommendation	4
Mine risk education specific to 
AVMs is not conducted in certain 
countries.
Civilian populations should be 
educated on the specific hazards 
posed by the types of AVMs found 
in their countries, including factors 
such as usage strategies and 
characteristics that might caution 
civilians developing new areas of 
land and enable their identification.
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OBSERVATIONS AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS RELATING 
TO DATA COLLECTION
Observation	5 Recommendation	5
There is a limited amount of 
information specific to AVMs in the 
public domain. States tend to report 
on and discuss landmine issues 
collectively, rather than differentiating 
between AVMs and APMs.
Greater emphasis should be placed 
on the distinction between APMs 
and AVMs, especially considering 
the existing differences in legal 
provisions concerning them and 
the different technical hazards they 
pose. States should be encouraged 
to disaggregate their landmine data 
according to type of contamination, 
as recom mended in the International 
Mine Action Standards (IMAS). 
In addition, states should also make 
these figures available to the public 
in order to inform open and public 
debate on the impact of this type 
of weapon. 
Observation	6 Recommendation	6
As found in the case studies of this 
research, AVM data sometimes 
cannot be aggregated, not because 
it is not being collected, but rather 
because the information cannot be 
easily extracted from the database 
of collection forms. The reasons for 
this seem to be due to the fact that 
personnel are free to use their own 
words: ‘anti-vehicle mine,’ ‘anti-tank 
mine,’ ‘AT,’ ‘ATM,’ etc. Therefore, 
when a staff member attempts to 
aggregate data by searching the 
database, not all of the reports on 
hazards or victims emerge.
Both Hazard Reporting Forms and 
Victim Reporting Forms should be 
further standardised. There should 
be a decrease in the reliance on 
‘free-text entry’ for identifying 
weapon types. A better practice 
might be to include boxes to check 
(as Cambodia’s forms demonstrate), 
so that AVM data can be easily 
aggregated, tracked and reported 
to the public and the international 
community.
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Observation	7 Recommendation	7
The case studies revealed that it is 
not easy to determine which AVM 
features may be causing the greatest 
negative impact (e.g. size, metal 
content, fusing structures, etc.). 
This is because it is not a common 
practice for states to include the 
model of the mines in their national 
reporting systems. While Hazard 
Report Forms and Victim Report 
Forms allow personnel to enter 
whether the mine is an AVM or an 
APM, some country forms do not 
include a field for identifying the 
model of the mine involved in an 
incident. In countries such as South 
Sudan, where a wide variety of 
foreign landmines have been used, 
it becomes difficult to understand 
the detailed impact of specific AVM 
types or characteristics.
It should become standard practice  
for government and mine action 
personnel to enter the mine model 
(if known) in Hazard Reports, 
Completion Reports and Victim 
Reports, using a standardised 
notation format so that the information 
can be sifted from the database. 
As this dataset grows, it will allow 
the international community to gain 
a better understanding of the details 
or characteristics of the effects of 
specific AVM types in order to help 
mitigate their effects on civilians.
ANTI-VEHICLE/TANK MINE TYPES AND MANUFACTURING 
COUNTRIES AS OF 2011134
Important note: This list is historic and should not be deemed absolute or complete. 
The majority of the mines are now no longer in production and several of the 
countries listed have banned the production of mines altogether.
Mine Type
Albania
MKTBT Anti-Tank Blast
MKT Mod 72 Anti-Tank Blast
Austria 
ATM 6 Anti-Tank Off route
ATM-7 Anti-Tank Off route
ATM-75, Model 67 Anti-Tank Blast
ATM 96 Anti-Tank Shaped Charge
ATM 2000E (Pz Mi 88) and ATM 2000 Anti-Tank Shaped Charge
AVC 100 Anti-Vehicle Directional Fragmentation
AVC 195 Anti-Vehicle Directional Fragmentation
Argentina 
FMK-3 Anti-Tank Blast
FMK-5 Anti-Tank Blast
Belgium
PRB M3/A1 Anti-Tank Blast
PRB-111 Anti-Tank Blast
Brazil 
AC NM AET1 Anti-Tank Blast
T-AB-1 (AT) Anti-Tank Blast
Bulgaria 
PTM-80P Anti-Tank Blast
TM-62M PZ (TM-62P3) Anti-Tank Blast
TMD-1 Anti-Tank
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Chile 
Cardoen Anti-Tank Anti-Tank Blast
MAT 84-F5 Anti-Tank Blast
MP-APVL 83-F4 Anti-Tank Fragmentation
China 
SATM Anti-Tank Shaped Charge
Type 72 ‘Non metallic’ Anti-Tank Blast
Type 72 ‘Metallic’ Anti-tank Blast
Type 84 Anti-Tank Shaped Charge
Cuba
AT Mine Anti-Tank Blast
Former Czechoslovakia 
Na-Mi-Ba Anti-Tank Blast
PT Mi-Ba Anti-Tank Blast
PT Mi-Ba-II Anti-Tank Blast
PT Mi-Ba-III Anti-Tank Blast
PT Mi-D Anti-Tank Blast
PT Mi-K Anti-Tank Blast
PT Mi-P Anti-Tank Shaped Charge
TQ-Mi Anti-Tank Blast
Czech Republic 
PD Mi-PK Anti-Tank Off Route
PT Mi-D1 & PT Mi-D1M Anti-Tank Shaped Charge
PT Mi-U Anti-Tank Shaped Charge
Egypt 
FBM Anti-Tank Blast
M/71 Anti-Tank Blast
M/80 Anti-Tank Blast
T-93 Anti-Tank Shaped Charge
TC/6 Anti-Tank Blast
France
HPD Anti-Tank
Finland 
MSM MK2 (PM-87) Anti-Tank Blast
TM-65 & TM-65/77 Anti-Tank Blast
Germany 
AT2 Anti-Tank Shaped Charge
DM 11 (AT) Anti-Tank Blast
DM 21 Anti-Tank Blast
MIFF Anti-Tank Shaped Charge
PARM 1 Anti-Tank Off Route Shaped Charge
PARM 2 Anti-Tank Off Route Shaped Charge
Appendix | 109
Germany (cont.)
PM-60 Anti-Tank Blast
Riegel Mine 43 Anti-Tank Blast
Tellermine 35 Anti-Tank Blast
Tellermine 42 Anti-Tank Blast
Tellermine 43 Anti-Tank Blast
Hungary 
HAK-1 Anti-Tank Shaped Charge
UKA-63 Anti-Tank Shaped Charge
India 
Adrushy Anti-Tank Blast
Mine Anti-tank ‘Non-Detectable’ 1A Anti-Tank Blast
Mine Anti-tank ‘Non-Detectable’ 3A Anti-Tank Blast
International 
ARGES (MACPED) Anti-Tank Off Route
ATIS Anti-Tank Blast
Iran 
M19 Anti-Tank Blast
YM-II Anti-Tank Blast
YM-III Anti-Tank Blast
Israel 
No 6 Anti-Tank Blast
Italy 
BAT/7 Anti-Tank Shaped Charge
MAT/5 Anti-Tank Blast
MAT/6 Anti-Tank blast
MATS/1.4 Anti-Tank Blast
MATS/2 Anti-Tank Blast
MATS/2.6 anti-Tank Blast
SB-MV/1 Anti-Tank Shaped Charge
SBP-04 Anti-Tank Blast
SBP-07 Anti-Tank Blast
TC/2.4 Anti-Tank Blast
TCE/6 Anti-Tank Blast
VS-3.6 Anti-Tank Blast
VS-AT4 and VS-AT4-EL Anti-Tank Blast
VS-HCT Anti-Tank Shaped Charge
VS-HCT2 Anti-Tank Shaped Charge
VS-HCT4 Anti-Tank Shaped Charge
VS-SATM1 Anti-Tank Shaped Charge
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Japan 
Type 63 (AT) Anti-Tank Blast
Type 93 Anti-Tank Blast
Korea, North 
ATM-44 Anti-Tank Blast
ATM-46N Anti-Tank Blast
ATM-72 Anti-Tank Blast
ATM-74 Anti-Tank Blast
Korea, South 
K441 and K442 Anti-Tank Shaped Charge
M19 Anti-Tank Blast
Montenegro
TMM-1 Anti-Tank
Netherlands
NR 25 Anti-Tank Blast
NR 26 and NR 26C1 Anti-Tank Blast
Type 2, T40 Anti-Tank Blast
Pakistan 
P2 Mk 2 (AT) Anti-Tank Blast
Peru 
MGP-30 Anti-Tank Blast
MGP-31 Anti-Tank Blast
Poland 
Kasia 100 Anti-Tank Off Route
Kasia 170 Anti-Tank Off Route
Kasia 2 x 100 Anti-Tank Off Route
MN-111 Anti-Tank Shaped Charge
MN-121 Anti-Tank Shaped Charge
MN-123 Anti-Tank Blast
MPB Anti-Tank Off Route
MPP-B ‘Wierzba’ Anti-Tank Blast
Portugal
M453 Anti-Tank Blast
Romania 
MAT-62B Anti-tank blast
MC-71 Anti-Tank Shaped Charge
MAT-76 Anti-Tank Blast
Russian Federation
PGMDM/PTM-1S/PTM-1G Anti-Tank Blast
PMK-1 Railway Mine
PTM-3 Anti-Tank Shaped Charge
TM-46/TMN-46 Anti-Tank Blast
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Russian Federation (cont.)
TM-57 Anti-Tank Blast
TM-62B Anti-Tank Blast
TM-62M Anti-Tank Blast
TM-72 Anti-Tank Shaped Charge
TM-83 Anti-Tank Off Route
TM-89 Anti-Tank Shaped Charge
TMD-44 Anti-Tank Blast
TMD-B Anti-Tank Blast
TMK-2 Anti-Tank Shaped Charge
Serbia
TMM-1 Anti-Tank
Singapore
STM-1 Anti-Tank Blast 
Slovakia
PT Mi-Ba Anti-Tank Blast 
South Africa 
Intelligent Horizontal Mine Anti-Tank Off Route
No 8 Anti-Tank Blast
‘Non-metallic’ anti-tank mine ‘Malapa’ Anti-Tank Blast
Spain 
C-3-A/B Anti-Tank Blast
Sweden 
FFV -16 (Fordonsmina 14) Anti-Tank Off Route
FFV -028 (Stridsvagnsmina 6) Anti-Tank Shaped Charge
Model 41-47 Anti-Tank Blast
Model 47 Anti-Tank Blast
Model 52 Anti-Tank Blast
Turkey
M19 Anti-Tank Blast
United Kingdom 
Adder, Addermine Anti-Tank Off Route
Barmine Anti-Tank Blast
Mk 5 Anti-Tank Blast
Mk 7 Anti-Tank Blast
United States
BLU-91/B ‘Gator’ Anti-Tank Shaped Charge
M1A1 Anti-Tank Blast
M6A2 Anti-Tank Blast
M7A2 Anti-Tank Blast
M15 Anti-Tank Blast
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United States (cont.)
M19 Anti-Tank Blast
M21 ‘heavy anti-tank mine’ Anti-Tank Shaped Charge
M24 Anti-Tank (HEAT warhead)
M75 Anti-Tank Shaped Charge
RAAM (M70) Anti-Tank Shaped Charge
SLAM Anti-Tank Off Route
Former Yugoslavia
KB-PTM (Ababeel) Anti-Tank Shaped Charge
TMA-1A Anti-Tank Blast
TMA-2 Anti-Tank Blast
TMA-3 Anti-Tank Blast
TMA-4 Anti-Tank Blast
TMA-5 Anti-Tank Blast
TMD-1/2 Anti-Tank Blast
TMM-1 Anti-Tank Blast
TMRP-6 Anti-Tank Shaped Charge
TMRP-7 Anti-Tank Shaped Charge
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